Regionalism and secession by Leavitt, Joseph F.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive


















Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 








Thesis Advisor:  Carolyn Halladay  
Co-Advisor:  Donald Abenheim  
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
REGIONALISM AND SECESSION 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S) Joseph F. Leavitt 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER  
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Catalonia and Bavaria today cling tightly to their linguistic distinctiveness, their cultural traditions, their culinary 
specialties, and their political particularity. Even after the passage of some centuries, these regions have not yet 
amalgamated into the nation states that contain them. And yet, Bavaria’s stubborn regionalism does not translate into 
any real longings for secession, whereas many Catalonians struggle actively and adamantly for autonomy. Why are 
there strong independence movements in Spain, but not in Germany? How have state formation and the relationship 
between the center and the region affected independence movements? 
This thesis provides a historical analysis of Bavarian and Catalan regionalism and argues that autonomy mitigates 
secession if the predominant state has accommodated sub-state regionalism. This thesis explains that the EU can 
either strengthen or weaken regional governments, depending upon the nature of the relationship between the regional 
governments and their associated national government. This thesis argues that the security of both a newly 
independent state and its parent government is worse off in the short term; the severity of the security situation 





14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Nationalism, secession, regionalism, EU, NATO. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
119 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
REGIONALISM AND SECESSION 
 
 
Joseph F. Leavitt 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2006 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
























Chair, Department of National Security Studies 
 iv




Catalonia and Bavaria today cling tightly to their linguistic distinctiveness, their cultural 
traditions, their culinary specialties, and their political particularity. Even after the 
passage of some centuries, these regions have not yet amalgamated into the nation states 
that contain them. And yet, Bavaria’s stubborn regionalism does not translate into any 
real longings for secession, whereas many Catalonians struggle actively and adamantly 
for autonomy. Why are there strong independence movements in Spain, but not in 
Germany? How have state formation and the relationship between the center and the 
region affected independence movements? 
This thesis provides a historical analysis of Bavarian and Catalan regionalism and 
argues that autonomy mitigates secession if the predominant state has accommodated 
sub-state regionalism. This thesis explains that the EU can either strengthen or weaken 
regional governments, depending upon the nature of the relationship between the regional 
governments and their associated national government. This thesis argues that the 
security of both a newly independent state and its parent government is worse off in the 
short term; the severity of the security situation depends on the nature of the divorce.  
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Nationalism as guiding political idea is alive and well in a united Europe, which 
in the year 2015 shows troubling signs of a return to the bad old ways of the 19th and the 
20th centuries. The character and nature of nationalism pose a challenge for students of 
security studies unfamiliar with how nation states have developed from their origins in 
the pre modern political order. The 18 September 2014 Scottish referendum on 
independence, spearheaded by the Scottish Nationalist Party, is but one recent example of 
its continued relevance. The violent fate of eastern Ukraine and claims of the vitality of 
“New Russia” in the year 2014 are yet another. Nationalism continues to work in 
different ways in different parts of Europe, however—even among places with 
comparable experiences of thwarted or deferred national independence which nonetheless 
in the present and recent past have not garnered headlines in US defense circles as has 
been the case recently in Eastern Europe. Yet these other examples are compelling and 
require analysis.  
For example, unlike the mutually agreed Scottish referendum, Catalonia held  
a non-official referendum on independence in defiance of Spanish authorities on  
9 November 2014. Bavaria, a subnational political, cultural, and economic state  within 
Germany within ancient and proud lineage, possesses no meaningful independence 
movements on par with what is seen elsewhere in Europe, and even as close by as in the 
South Tirol in Italy. 
Some three centuries earlier, in 1714, Catalonia lost its independence, as it had 
joined the losing side during the War of Spanish Succession. In 1866, Bavaria lost its de-
facto independence as it was on the losing side of the Austro-Prussian war.  Today, both 
regions maintain high degrees of distinct historical, social and cultural identity and are 
among the strongest-performing regions in their respective countries.  Yet while millions 
of Catalonians—out of a population of just 7.5 million—have demonstrated in the streets 
for independence for the last few years on 11 September, the day Catalonia lost its 
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autonomy, no similar independence movements exist in the Germany of 2015,1 even 
though regionalism thrives in the Federal Republic and the ideal of a German citizen’s 
home town, or Heimat, remains a touchstone of contemporary political and cultural 
identity. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND THESIS STATEMENT 
Catalonia and Bavaria today cling tightly to their linguistic distinctiveness, their 
cultural traditions, their culinary specialties, and their political particularity.  Even after 
the passage of some centuries, these regions have not yet amalgamated into the nation 
states that contain them.  And yet, Bavaria’s stubborn regionalism does not translate into 
any real longings for secession, where Catalonians struggle actively and adamantly for 
autonomy. Artur Mas, the president of Catalonia’s Convergence and Union (CiU) 
political alliance and Catalonia’s regional government, pushed for a referendum on 
independence to take place on 9 November 2014 and continues to support Catalan self-
determination. Why are there strong independence movements in Spain, but not in 
Germany? How have state formation and the relationship between the center and the 
region affected independence movements? 
This thesis argues that autonomy mitigates secession if the predominant nation 
state has accommodated sub-state regionalism. Even if a state or locality has lost its 
independence by integration into a larger nation-sate, the newly incorporated state will 
not inevitably long for its former independence. If the unifying state has respected 
existing political and cultural institutions, at least in a significant manner, the newly 
integrated state is likely to maintain associational regionalism and not exclusive 
regionalism.  
                                                 
1 Ishaan Tharoor, “Ahead of Scotland’s referendum, Catalonia thinks its own time has come,” 




B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Nationalism can be a unifying force or an exclusionary force in mass politics and 
a cause of war in the worst case, depending on how the nation state constructs its identity. 
If the nation state can foster an inclusive form of nationalism, which accommodates 
subnational identities, the potential exists to overcome the perils of nationalism—dangers 
that often lead to military conflict. At the supranational level, the European Union (EU) 
has the potential to influence subnational movements. If the EU understands the nature of 
subnational regionalism and subnational identities feel like the EU represents their 
interests, then the EU may be able to play a role in mitigating secessionist tendencies. 
Thus, a better understanding of the features of government, ideas, society, mass politics, 
and even the fact of luck that differentiate independence-seeking regionalism versus 
association-seeking regionalism. An understanding of these forces, so little in evidence in 
the making of policy in many places in conflict in the last 20 years in Europe, the Middle 
East as well as Asia and beyond,  will better position governments and policy-makers as 
well as those charged with the execution of policy at the operational level to understand 
and manage secessionist regional movements and ultimately to prevent or mitigate 
potentially violent conflicts, unlike what has transpired in 2014 in Ukraine and what took 
place in earlier epochs in the two areas under inquiry here.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many recent academic works focusing on nationalism have diminished or 
neglected the role of regionalism.2 Additionally, the regional variants of National 
Socialism in Germany and Francoism in Spain have received little attention with regard 
to how they influenced regional separatist movements. Scholars from the late 19th 
century declared sub-state nationalism extinct due to the rise of the industrial revolution’s 
new “socio-economic divisions” that rendered territorial, cultural, and national forms of 
                                                 
2 Xosé-Manoel Núñez, “Historiographical Approaches to Sub-national Identities in Europe: A 
Reappraisal and Some Suggestions” in Region and State in Nineteenth Century Europe: Nation-Building, 
Regional Identities and Separatism edited by Joost Augusteijn and Eric Storm (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 14.  
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allegiance obsolete.3 More recently, Celia Applegate provided a detailed analysis on how 
the focus on the nation state in the inter-war period and postwar period led to the 
relegation of regions to the domain of “amateur” studies.4 This exclusive focus on the 
nation state has underplayed, if not obscured, the impact of regionalism shaping national 
societies and identities. Even with the rise of modernization theory in the 1960s and 
globalization-related studies in the 1990s, subnational units continue to be overlooked.5  
Current scholarship addresses the continued authority of the nation state even if it 
has become more integrated into such supranational institutions as the European Union. 
After the end of the cold war, numerous scholars attempted to predict what the end of 
history would look like. Samuel Huntington argues that while scholars have predicted 
various forms of international relations, from the “return of traditional rivalries between 
nation states” to the “decline of the nation state,” future fault lines will be between 
“civilizations,” suggesting a relegation of the nation state as a merely an input to what 
constitutes a civilization.6 In Europe today, the nation state continues to play a paramount 
role, but regional representation in the EU coexists with nation state representation, even 
if not as influential. Yet “regional representation within the European Union has received 
“little attention.”7 Regional movements, conditioned by national pressures, have persisted 
and often demanded increased autonomy or independence from their national 
governments. The European Union’s multilayered governance structure, however 
complicated, may serve as a modern governance example that successfully manages 
internal representation from subnational regions to national governments, while at the 
same time being perceived by outsiders as a supranational, unified civilization. If the EU 
can effectively manage competing levels of governance, it has the potential to act as a 
                                                 
3 André Lecours, “Sub-state Nationalism in the Western World: Explaining Continued Appeal,” 
Ethnopolitics 11 (June 2012): 268. 
4 Celia Applegate, “A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in 
Modern Times,” The American Historical Review 104 (October 1999): 1162.  
5 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism a Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and 
Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1998), 2.; André Lecours, “Sub-state Nationalism in the Western World: 
Explaining Continued Appeal,” Ethnopolitics 11 (2012): 268.  
6 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,”? Foreign Affairs 72, no.3 (1993): 22.  
7 Ekaterina Domorenok, “The Committee of the Regions: in Search of Identity,” Regional and Federal 
Studies 19 (2009): 144. 
 5
counter-weight to nation-based conflict, including nationalism-inspired independence 
movements.  
1. Autonomy and Secession  
No consensus has emerged to explain the presence or absence of independence 
movements in Western Europe. Some authors have argued that autonomous sub-national 
communities are more likely to secede than those communities that lack autonomy.8 
Others argue that autonomy quells the urge for secession by providing a mechanism for 
the state to adjudicate potentially problematic issues.9 David S. Siroky and John Cuffe 
argue that the binary notion of autonomy–either having it or not—is too simplistic and 
fails to provide sufficient specificity to develop an empirical hypothesis. In their article 
“Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism,” Siroky and Cuffe argue that a more 
nuanced division is necessary, one that accounts for the way that a region came to its 
current status. They categorize groups into formerly autonomous, never autonomous, and 
lost autonomy, and conclude that groups that have lost autonomy are two times more 
likely to seek secession than never autonomous groups.10 (They define autonomy as “a 
form of internal self-determination that provides a group with actual powers and 
resources for self-governance within a state.”11) However, given that Bavaria and 
Catalonia lost independence, rather than autonomy as the authors mean it, they would not 
exactly fit into Siroky and Cuffe’s model. The authors do not differentiate between lost 
autonomy and lost independence, which could have different results. Bavaria and 
Catalonia, which are currently autonomous, were previously independent and would not 
initially fall into the lost autonomy category. Thus, Bavaria and Catalonia may not be 
fully explained by Siroky and Cuffe’s model. Indeed, Siroky and Cuffe acknowledge 
further research is needed to investigate the causal mechanisms that underpin separatist  
 
                                                 
8 David S. Siroky and John Cuffe, “Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism,” Comparative 
Political Studies 48 (January 2014): 2, doi: 10.1177/0010414013516927. 
9 Ibid., 2. 
10 Siroky and Cuffe, “Lost Autonomy,” 23.  
11 Ibid., 2. 
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movements.12 This thesis expands on Siroky and Cuffe’s framework by including 
formerly independent states Bavaria and Catalonia and by arguing that the center-
periphery relationship has been a determinant factor in sovereignty seeking regional 
movements. 
One might expect that with this model, several previously independent territories 
that were subsequently annexed to Prussia in 1866 would have pursued separatism, yet no 
widespread opposition emerged in this wave of annexations and “sub-state regionalism” 
rarely developed in these annexed territories.13 Bavarian regionalism, which had both 
political and cultural aspects, persisted after German unification, but the political aspects 
of Bavarian regionalism harkened back to historical memories rather than present 
realities. This nostalgia of an earlier epoch maintained a sense of “uniqueness and 
independence even after their statehood had disappeared.”14  
Furthermore, German Romantic authors, notably Johann Gottfried Herder, 
propagated the concept of Kulturnation, a nation with a common culture, which would 
later be used by German nation-builders to unify a diverse Germany on the basis of a 
common language, shared ethnic heritage, and cultural affinities.15 In Spain, by contrast, 
a comparable concept may have been less effective in assimilating the peripheral regions, 
such as Catalonia, amid the more muscular centralizing tendencies of successive Spanish 
governments, most obviously during the Franco regime.  
Jaime Lluch establishes a critical distinction between “association-seeking” and 
“sovereignty-seeking” subnational movements and provides a theoretical framework to 
explain why these movements take different paths.16 He goes further to apply this 
framework to account for the differing national movements in the Basque Country and 
                                                 
12 Siroky and Cuffe, “Lost Autonomy,” 24. 
13 Siegfried Weichlein, “Regionalism, Federalism and Nationalism in the German Empire,” in Region 
and State in Nineteenth Century Europe: Nation-Building, Regional Identities and Separatism edited by 
Joost Augusteijn and Eric Storm (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 94.  
14 Ibid., 94.  
15 Ivan T. Berend, History Derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 57. 
16 Jaime Lluch, “Sovereigntists and Associationists: Explaining the Origins of National Movements’ 
Political Orientation” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 17 (April 2011): 208. 
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Spain. Though his focus is on the origins of these movements, he argues that the 
Convergence and Union coalition in Catalonia “does not propose independence from 
Spain.”17 He argues that because Catalan nationalism was more dependent on sound 
economic relations with Spain, the Catalan elites could only advocate for a Catalan 
nationalism that was interoperable with Spanish nationalism.18 Economic transformation 
in the Basque country, by contrast, displaced a larger share of the agrarian population, 
leading to a stronger social base that advocated for separatism and a rejection of Madrid’s 
capitalist policies.19  
However, the nature of Catalan nationalism has changed in recent years. 
Montserrat Guibernau provides a theoretical framework that explains the evolution of 
Catalan nationalism to Catalan secessionism.20 Asier Blas adds to this framework by 
emphasizing the economic and fiscal problems which have aggrieved Catalonia’s sense 
of victimization and driven Catalonia’s nationalism from the “voice option to the exit 
option.”21  
2. Origins and Causes of Regional Movements in Spain and Germany  
Much of the literature that explores the origins of regionalism examines data 
qualitatively using tools such as the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) database or the 
Minorities at Risk (MAR). While these sources are useful to derive more broad 
conclusions, few works offer qualitative comparisons regarding the origins of sub-
national regional movements. Rune Dahl Fitjar measures the variance of regionalism over 
time and space, using empirical data, and then supports her argument by examining 
regional movements within the United Kingdom and Norway.22 She concludes that 
“regionalism is likely to be more prevalent in regions with a regional language, a high 
                                                 
17 Lluch, “Sovereigntists and Associationists,” 208. 
18 Ibid., 209. 
19 Ibid., 216. 
20 Montserrat Guibernau, “Secessionism in Catalonia,” 368. 
21 Asier Blas, “Catalonian Secessionism Made in Spain,” Ethnopolitics 12 (November 2013): 399. 
22 Rune Dahl Fitjar, The Rise of Regionalism: Causes of Regional Mobilization in Western Europe 
(London: Routledge, 2010): 66. 
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level of economic development and highly regionalized party systems, and which are 
closely integrated into the European Union.”23 Montserrat Guibernau explains why 
nations without states in Western Europe have recently emerged as sub-state political 
forces by exploring the forces of globalization, devolution, and transnational identities.24 
Guibernau concludes that a type of “emancipatory nationalism” has emerged that allows 
for nations without states to determine their political future.25 In Catalonia, Guibernau 
argues that this process has emerged due to the rise of democracy, which allows people to 
express themselves without fear and the failure of the Spanish state to allow for further 
devolution.26  
More specifically, Joose Augusteijn and Eric Storm’s Region and State in 
Nineteenth Century Europe provide robust foundations to explore the origins of regional 
and national movements in Spain (chapter 8) and Germany (chapter 6). In chapter 6, 
Siegfried Weichlein explains how German regionalism varied from other European 
regionalisms. First, German regionalism was multilayered; it corresponded both to a form 
of subnational regionalism and also regionalisms within historic German states, such as 
Bavaria.27 Second, cooperative federalism—a development after 1848, which allowed 
German states and their associated dynasties to maintain an administrative function, 
mitigated secessionist tendencies.28 In chapter 8, Josep Fradera explains that regionalism 
in Spain was held together by Spain’s overseas empire.29 However, Spain’s failure to 
effectively integrate its colonies—a lynchpin of Spain’s continental unity—led to the 
unraveling of its empire.30 The final blow to Spanish unity, the loss of Philippines and 
                                                 
23 Fitjar, The Rise of Regionalism, 66. 
24 John Ikenberry, “Nations Without States: Political Communities in a Global Age,” Foreign Affairs 
September 4, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55455/g-john-ikenberry/nations-without-states-
political-communities-in-a-global-age. 
25 Montserrat Guibernau, “Secessionism in Catalonia,” 390. 
26 Ibid., 391. 
27 Siegfried Weichlein, “Regionalism, Federalism, and Nationalism,” 95. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Joost Augusteijn and Eric Storm, Region and State in Nineteenth Century Europe: Nation-Building, 
Regional Identities and Separatism (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 7.  
30 Ibid. 
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Cuba in the Spanish American War, weakened Spanish unity and allowed cultural 
regionalism to become increasingly politicized. Thus, while Germany both integrated and 
to some degree kept intact dynastic state infrastructures, Spain failed to effectively 
nationalize internal regions. When the Spanish empire came crumbling down in 1898, so 
too did any appearances of national unity.  
Celia Applegate, in A Nation of Provincials, provides an authoritative work that 
analyzes the meaning and evolution of Heimat in Germany by focusing on the Rhenish 
Pfalz and using it as a lens to understand how a larger sense of German Heimat may be 
understood. She explains the relationship—however problematic—between the region 
and the nation and how this connection acted as a bulwark to keep the German nation 
unified against centrifugal pressures.31 While she acknowledges that “German national 
consciousness could not have spread” without such physical manifestations of the 
industrial revolution as railroads, she rejects the proposition that a specific type of 
“rationality and progressivism” is inherent in this national consciousness.32 Rather, the 
persistence of the notion of Heimat, which emphasized local customs, coexisted and 
interoperated with a larger sense of German consciousness.33  
Katharine D. Kennedy contributes to understanding regionalism in Southern 
Germany.34 She rejects the argument that cultural regionalism in Southern Germany at 
least until 1914 had become nationalized by explaining that local authorities still 
controlled school curricula which emphasized Bavaria’s Heimatkunde. Textbooks in 
Bavaria after German unification still focused on the “cult of the regional monarch,” 
which “overshadowed the imperial cult.”35 The Bavarian Minister of Education, Johann 
von Lutz, had to remind school officials in Lower Franconia that Bavaria was “no longer 
                                                 
31 Celia Applegate,  A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 6. 
32 Ibid., 12. 
33 Ibid., 13. 
34 Katharine D. Kennedy, “Regionalism and Nationalism in South German History Lessons,” German 
Studies Review 12 (February 1989): 11–33. 
35 Ibid., 16. 
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an independent country.”36 Kennedy challenges the degree to which volkish ideology had 
penetrated Bavarian historiography, by demonstrating that at least until 1914 no national 
curriculum existed throughout Germany.37 She concludes by arguing that a more uniform 
version of German history came to Southern Germany not from a top-down mandate, but 
from an eventual push by educators to create a “more teachable, interesting, and patriotic 
curriculum for young children.”38 
Angel Smith describes how Catalonia’s political regionalism became radicalized 
in the second half of the 19th century.39 He explains that political and cultural 
regionalism in Catalonia, which emphasized Catalonia’s uniqueness as a special nation, 
combined in the 1880s to demand for increasing political devolution—a theme that has 
remained at the center of Madrid-Barcelona relations since then.40  
3. Local, Regional, and National Identity during Hitler’s Germany and 
Franco’s Spain 
Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann and Maiken Umbach challenge the prevailing 
view that National Socialism relied largely on a national framework of spatial identity.41 
Rather, they explore how “Heimat, region and empire were constantly imagined, 
constructed and re-moulded through their relationship with one another.”42 Similarly, 
Xosé Manoel Núñez and Maiken Umbach in “Hijacked Heimats: National 
Appropriations of Local and Regional Identities in Germany and Spain, 1930–1945” 
explain how both Franco and Hitler often promoted cultural regionalism while 
suppressing political regionalism, which they viewed as potential threats to their national 
visions. Rather than homogenizing the entire nation state, both rulers made a “clear 
                                                 
36 Kennedy, “Regionalism and Nationalism,” 16. 
37 Ibid., 19–20. 
38 Ibid., 26. 
39 Angel Smith, The Origins of Catalan Nationalism, 1770–1898 (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann and Maiken Umbach, Heimat, Region and Empire: Spatial 
Identities under National Socialism (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 16. 
42 Ibid. 
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distinction” between “cultural diversity, which could be embraced and manipulated, and 
centrifugal political forcers, which were repressed because they clashed with the strategic 
and economic objectives” of their regimes.43  
In Nazi Germany, Hitler viewed the solution to Bavaria’s hatred of Prussian 
hegemony as a Germany of regions.44 Rather than espousing Berlin to be the capital of a 
centralized Germany, Berlin, according to these authors’ interpretation of Mein Kampf, 
would serve as the capital of a “distinctly Prussian region…which can happily coexist 
with the peculiarities of other German regions.”45 The Nazi regime embraced regional 
dialects, as long as they were not linked to political projects.46 
Franco’s Spain was not so different. While is true that Franco’s regime placed 
restrictions on cultural expressions, including the use of local languages, there was not 
always uniform opposition to the use of minority languages—especially if their use could 
be appropriated for Franco’s nationalizing project. 47 In contexts where local language 
use was prohibited, de facto opposition varied depending on the degree to which Franco 
perceived it as a threat. Thus, the publication of “religious and folkloristic literature in 
regional languages” was not only sometimes unopposed, but also re-appropriated for 
national propaganda.48 Iconic images from Spanish regions, such as the monastery of 
Montserrat in Catalonia, were reprinted on postage stamps in an attempt to appeal to the 
regions and to prevent internal secessionist movements.49  
Carmen Ortiz explains how Franco—through the use of folklore and aesthetics—
on the one hand sought to gain broad support by recognizing different regions, while at 
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the same time ensuring Castilian regionalism’s hegemony.50 She finds that the Spanish 
concept of the nation is similar to Hitler’s, which views peasants as “the founding-stone 
of the whole nation.”51 This focus on the individual and the individual’s unity with the 
nation allowed Franco to depoliticize regionalism by focusing on cultural aspects, rather 
than political aspirations.52 The regime’s romanticized image of a countryman was used 
as a vehicle to gloss over class differences and “regional contradictions.”53 By 
emphasizing the peasant, who theoretically could be from any region, the regime 
grounded itself with a sense of legitimacy.54 Yet, despite the idealized image of the 
peasant, the hegemony of Castile was undisputed. Castilian was a marker of how Spanish 
one was, similar to how the term, das Germanische, or “Germanness,” indicated how 
German one was.55  
4. Regional Representation in the European Union and its Effect on 
Regional Independence Movements 
Few works, if any, have addressed whether regional representation in the EU has 
specifically increased the collective mobilization of particular independence movements. 
However, several works explore the general impact of regional representation in the 
European Union. Andjelka Pantovic and Mwita Chacha argue that sub-national regions 
have gained increasing influence in the European Union.56 Rune Dahl Fitjar suggests that 
the European Union has empowered some regional movements at the expense of national 
capitals.57 Jeffery Charlie suggests that EU regional representation has remained 
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insignificant.58 Some authors suggest regional representation in the EU has actually 
disempowered regional movements.59  
While most authors agree that regional representation is not as influential as 
national member-state representation, there exists no consensus on whether regional 
representation in the EU has been to the detriment of national representation or whether 
regional representation serves as a way to fulfil regional political representation and 
potentially subdue sub-national demands for increased autonomy or independence. Fewer 
works examine the specific influence of the European Union on particular regional 
movements. Angela Bourne examines how the EU has Basque political regionalism, but 
few other comprehensive works examine the specific effects of particular regional 
representation within the EU.60 Further research is needed to assess which theoretical 
approaches of regional representation within the EU best explain the German and Spanish 
political regionalism. 
D. HYPOTHESES AND EXPLANATIONS 
There are three general hypotheses that may account for the stronger 
independence seeking movements in Spain and the weaker ones in Germany. First, 
Germany’s federal structure, which has allowed regions to maintain significant cultural, 
fiscal, and political autonomy, may have led to a more cooperative relationship between 
the periphery and the center, mitigating separatist tendencies.61 Prussia annexed regions 
that already exhibited strong political institutions and thus could not unify all of Germany 
devoid of significant resistance unless it recognized and respecting—to some degree—
regional power structures. Thus, while regionalism persisted in Germany, it may have 
become more compatible with German nationalism because people in the regions 
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conceived their Heimat as Germany. In Spain on the other hand, most political power, 
especially after 1812, was centered almost exclusively in Castile.62 Madrid may have 
viewed Catalonian and Basque nationalism as threats not compatible with Spanish 
nationalism.63  
Second, the centuries-old decline of Spain’s empire,64 particularly after 1898, left 
the nation demoralized and may have enabled and inspired regional movements, 
particularly in Catalonia and the Basque country to demand increased autonomy or 
independence from Madrid. In contrast, Germany was rising in economic and political 
power at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century. The Spanish Civil 
War left the country in disarray and led to the emergence of a dictatorship that sought to 
keep the country together. Franco’s suppression of Catalan and Basque nationalism may 
have further radicalized these movements, leading to their reemergence after his death.  
Third, the degree to which regions in Spain and Germany possess fiscal autonomy 
may be a contributing factor towards political regionalism and secession. Economic 
inequality alone may not cause secessionism, but it may exacerbate cultural and political 
tensions. By the latter half of the 19th century, Catalonia, and to a lesser extent the 
Basque country, became leading economic regions in Spain. The disproportionate fiscal 
burden held by Catalonia may have radicalized Catalonian nationalism. One factor that 
may have kept Bavarian nationalism as association-seeking rather than sovereignty 
seeking may have been Bavaria’s relatively high fiscal autonomy.  
E. ROADMAP 
Chapter II explains how Bavarian regionalism, despite its unique characteristics, 
interoperated with and was accommodated by German nationalism. Chapter III explains 
how Catalonian regionalism evolved from association seeking to exclusive regionalism 
due to the increasing hegemony of Castilian political and cultural institutions. It also 
argues that despite recent trends towards devolution, Madrid’s efforts have not been 
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consistent and significant enough to mitigate strong secessionist trends in Catalonia. 
Chapter IV argues that the European Union can either strengthen or weaken political 
regionalism, depending on the relationship between the center and the periphery. Chapter 
V argues that the short-term security situation in any newly independent country and its 
former country will be worse off.  
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II. GERMAN REGIONALISM 
The Federal Republic of Germany today, as its name and constitution implies 
exhibits high degrees of regional diversity, but it has no strong secessionist movements. 
This fact has been scarcely the result of chance, but rather of deliberate customs, 
traditions, politics, and sensible federalist actions and unique circumstances that enabled 
the German nation state to accommodate regionalism. The pluralism of politics and 
culture that is core to Germany’s regionalism have mitigated secessionist tendencies and 
increased the German state’s long-term unity, although today’s Germany since 1990 has 
hardly been the norm for a longer historical period.  
 German regionalism’s nature is best understood by examining three distinct 
periods. The first period, spanning from before German unification to the outbreak of 
World War I, formed the latter two in terms of Bavarian autonomy. The second period, 
which spans the duration of Nazi Germany (1933–1945), sheds light on how the state 
exploited—but did not completely eliminate—cultural regionalism. The final period of 
this chapter examines post-World War II Germany, which preserved and enshrined 
German regionalism. 
A. INTEGRATING GERMAN REGIONS: GERMAN UNIFICATION UP 
THROUGH WORLD WAR I (1806–1914) 
Up to and shortly after German unification in 1871, three characteristics enabled 
German nationalism to more effectively integrate the several regions: cultural-linguistic 
unity, preservation of regional structures, and the importance of one’s locality or region 
in understanding the German nation state. The most salient fact is the legacy and custom 
of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, a state on the medieval model, whose 
diversity was legion and which was able to operate on a political basis that became 
obsolete in the course of the late 18th century before the First Reich was finally abolished 
by Napoleon on 1806 with the abdication of the Habsburg emperor from his medieval 
German mission. Habsburg had been the leading dynasty, but only one of many. Its 
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character was central to this legacy of pluralism in what finally became Kleindeutschland 
in the hands of Bismarck.  
Culture and language as these became tools or even weapons of politics acted as 
catalysts for Germany’s nation-building project by bridging estate and later class divides 
and promoting the German language and culture, regardless of locale, as a unifying 
identity. Rather than eliminating and stamping out in some centralized form the pre-
existing regional institutions that had been resistant to German unification, as it could 
have done, Prussia tolerated them, although the Catholic Church was at times an 
exception to this generalization in the 19th century. Prussia’s preservation of regional 
structures, not the least because it was itself, a state made up of widely different regions 
and areas with distinct culture and tradition, facilitated regional support for Germany’s 
nation state and allowed Prussia to leverage existing institutions of state, culture, society 
and economy to consolidate Germany’s stability. In light of the growing German nation 
state with varying regional cultures, the experiences and attachment to one’s ancient, 
traditional and even apolitical homeland in the sense of mass politics acted as a lens from 
which to understand and reconciles Germanness with enduring regional affinities. 
Understanding the presence, absence, and characteristics of these formative features of 
German nation-building sheds light on how Germany developed into a centralized, 
totalitarian “Hitler State” (which, itself, was really not as centralized and unitary as its 
name betrays) and how Germany returned to become an integrative federation that 
accommodates regional diversity.65  
1. Kulturnation 
While Germany did not become a nation state until 1871, German nationalism 
still managed to spread via the reaction to French reason, Napoleon, and via the transition 
from folk lore to propaganda and mass movement that is typical of central and eastern 
Europe. This phenomenon was largely due to the influence of German nationalists and 
patriotic groups in a nation in which the book became an object of national respect, as 
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well as music and art, with a nationalistic character in answer to fashion and customs 
from east and west. Furthermore, their writings could reach a wide audience given that 
literacy in German territories by the middle of the 19th century had reached 75 percent.66 
The Kulturnation, a concept formulated by philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder as early 
as the 1760s, was born in Germany. With the French Revolution as a model, in the 1810s, 
romantic elites realized that, in order to succeed as a nation, they would have to build 
solidarity through common cultural experience and the German language.67  
The rise of a standardized German language also helped achieve a degree of 
cultural unity. Low German, which possessed a substantial literature in the early Middle 
Ages, was overtaken by the use of High German in the latter part of the Middle Ages, as 
this was the language used in the imperial Court and in influential German states.68 The 
publication of Martin Luther’s Bible and associated doctrinal publications in the early 
1500s accelerated the demise of Low German. At the same time, Luther’s publications 
split German populations between the forces of the Catholic Church and the Protestant 
Reformation, which would lead to the Thirty Years War.69 From the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 to the end of the 18th century, German language was simply a form 
of communication; any sense of a German-nation united by a common language was an 
abstract idea for another century and a half.70  
While the literature and market for High German had become more widespread, it 
was not until the end of the 18th century when German nationalists deliberately attached 
the use of High German to the national movement in the face of the French Revolution 
and the Napoleonic conquest of western Germany and beyond.71 While the study of 
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regional German dialects, such as Low German, was an area the German regional studies 
experts focused on, the use of Low German, which resembles Dutch, as a national 
language would not have been allowed by German nationalists.72 “As a new professional 
liberal class emerged in the 18th century, so too did a national form of German literature 
develop.73 By the early 19th century, this new social class, by rejecting France’s ‘cultural 
hegemony,’ not only helped cement the adoption of the German language, but also 
helped to create a “uniform standard of taste and judgment.”74 The German dialect had 
coalesced by this time and German elites deliberately published works to create a 
common cultural understanding.75 This national literature reached larger audiences by the 
mid-19th century amidst a growing sense of national consciousness facilitated by an 
increasingly literate and mobilized public. Thus, despite persisting regional differences, 
the adoption of a standardized language affirmed national unity, even in the absence of a 
nation state.  
The gymnastics movement, which arose in the early 19th century, was one 
German nationalist idea for achieving cultural unity across class and regional divides. In 
1811, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, a leading bourgeois figure in the national movement 
against the French, developed a gymnastics organization that unified Germans against a 
foreign enemy and overcame internal estate and later class divides.76 Gymnastics was not 
just a sport; “gymnastics were supposed to train fighters for the liberation of Germany.”77 
Jahn argued that his gymnasts had to be ready to fight against the French occupiers.78 
Foretelling the writings of Carl Schmitt, a German political theorist of the Nazi era and 
thereafter, Jahn understood that these gymnasts, his “freedom fighters,” derived their 
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value from the “real possibility of physical killing.”79 “The new, mandatory gymnast 
uniform was designed not only to enhance a gymnast’s performance, but to tear down 
any class divides; it mattered not whether you had high social status or not—what 
mattered was that you were a German.”80 Jahn knew that allowing gymnasts to 
differentiate themselves along estate lines would hinder German unity and cause division 
within the German nation.  
Nationalist movements in Germany unified people against a common enemy 
while suppressing internal divisions. Jahn understood the importance of friend-enemy 
groupings as Carl Schmitt later wrote at the end of the Weimar Republic and on the eve 
of the Third Reich in The Concept of the Political: “the intensification of internal 
antagonisms has the effect of weakening the common identity vis-à-vis another state” and 
therefore the basis for violent conflict would unfold internally rather than directed against 
a foreign enemy.”81 In 1817, when young German nationalists held a festival at Wartburg 
Castle, nationalism overcame internal divisions.82 Protestants and Catholics attended 
each other’s worship services, showing that German patriotism was more important than 
religious differences.83 Even Jews, in the midst of growing anti-Semitism, partook in 
Christian ceremonies.84  
2. Preservation of Subnational Institutions 
While the Kulturnation helped create the idea of a unified German nation, it was 
Prussia’s preservation of certain regional structures that enabled it to create an inclusive 
and stable state. German unification, though driven by Prussia, retained key features of 
the order from the First Reich as well as the reordering of the central European system 
from Napoleon through Metternich. Bavaria’s transformation from a region that had 
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adhered to the south German and Catholic orientation hinging on Vienna and Habsburg 
to a kingdom that accepted it shows how Germany’s nation-building project successfully 
incorporated existing political structures in contrast to the epoch of conflict in which 
Prussians and Bavarians had fought each other in the period 1618–1648 as well as in the 
intervening conflicts in which Prussians had fought the Saxons and the Habsburgs. While 
Bavaria’s defeat in the 1866 Austro Prussian War may have weakened its position to 
resist German unification,85 Bavaria’s successful integration into Germany was not 
guaranteed. Even after Bavaria’s defeat, politicians (such as Joseph Edmung Jörg, the 
leader of the Bavarian Patriot Party) argued that joining Germany “might undermine the 
very existence of Bavaria.”86 At the same time, Bavarian nationalists recognized that 
voting to remain outside of the new Reich would mean disintegration; sub-state regions 
in Bavaria, such as the Palatinate, felt sympathetic towards German integration.87  
Additionally, the revolutions of 1848 illustrated that the ruling order of the 
Metternich system, established to protect the status quo restored after 1815, had failed; 
among Bavarian elites with their Habsburg orientation as well as their Catholicism, there 
was a widespread fear of the “impending danger and decline” of the “European system of 
states.”88 These elites may have found that a negotiated accession union with Prussia may 
have been in their best interests to promote their regional autonomy as in times past when 
they had been a leading dynasty of the Old Reich.  
 While the imminent Franco-Prussian War likely pushed Bavaria to either accept a 
negotiated union with Prussia or a “forced ‘union’” with France, the Bavarian parliament 
and King only accepted a union with Prussia after they ensured that “the Bavarian crown 
would still be sovereign…and would control its own military.”89  
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Bavaria integrated into the Second German Reich with many of its institutions 
intact in 1871. This sense of “cooperative federalism,” which began to emerge after the 
failed national revolutions of 1848, allowed historic German polities such as Bavaria to 
maintain authority. Bavaria was still able to implement federal policies, even if the power 
of the states remained with the regional monarchs—a fact that socialists resented, and one 
that left a deep ideological divide between socialists and conservative federalists.90 
Rather than suppressing Bavarian regionalism, Prussia accepted Bavarian regionalism as 
a constituent part of the German Reich—a Reich which derived as much of its power 
from its constituent states as it did from Prussia. Furthermore, Bavaria, like other member 
states, maintained influence in the German Reich via the Bundesrat, a territorially based 
legislative body at the federal level, through which it was able to defend its autonomy.91 
Even under Bismarck, the “Iron Chancellor,” known for unifying German under the force 
of the state, many states preserved their traditional autonomies in key areas of 
government and society as well as economy.92 Bismarck’s deliberate but judicious 
national unification project is evidenced in a letter he sent his representative in Munich in 
1869: 
That German unity could be promoted by actions involving force, I think 
is self-evident…A voluntary intervention in the evolution of history, 
which is determined by purely subjective factors, results only in the 
shaking down of unripe fruit, and that German unity is no ripe fruit at this 
time leaps, in my opinion, to the eye…The ability to wait while conditions 
develop is a requisite of practical policy.93 
While Bavaria lost its independence by joining the North German Confederation 
in 1871, Bavaria retained a subnational infrastructure and a significant degree of 
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autonomy. This factor allowed for a smoother integration into the German nation state. In 
the end, Prussia assessed Bavaria’s strong regionalism less as a threat and more as an 
institution for building German unity. While Bavaria maintained its regional pride, the 
negotiated integration of Bavaria into the Reich mitigated Bavarian regionalism from 
becoming sovereignty-seeking. 
3. How Heimat Mediated the Local and the National 
The German concept Heimat, or ancient and traditional homeland as in the French 
term Pays and with its later associations of blood and soil concepts of the nation state,94 
allowed Germany to more effectively integrate regions into the nation state of the Second 
Reich. Germany had a long history of regionalism derived from the First Reich, which 
was manifested most prominently in the 19th century Heimat movement—a movement 
that allowed regions to be the manner by which people associated themselves with the 
nation state in an individual manner. Heimat helped bridge the divide between the 
traditional premodern, Habsburg oriented particularism of the various German states and 
the idea of a larger nation state as nationalism emerged in the later part of the 19th 
century in Central Europe.95  
There were two ways by which Heimat became catalyst for German integration, 
while at the same time maintaining varying degrees of local autonomy. First, people 
understood that Heimat was a pillar of the German nation state once it actually began to 
exist in 1871. Germans began to see the nation’s “imagined community” through the lens 
of everyday interactions in their locality.96 As Maiken Umbach and Claus-Christian W. 
Szejnmann explain, “Heimat became a way of making one’s attachment to the nation 
thinkable, configuring identity not as the property of an individual but as a cultural 
construct.”97 Each province became the manifestation of the greater German nation state, 
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allowing for regionalisms to coexist and become, for many, the “iconography of German 
nationhood.”98 The Heimat movement, much like the gymnast movement transcended 
class and political lines, but was as much a thing of literate middle class of the 19th 
century as anything. It provided a sense of connection and belonging to the German 
nation through the region in their rich variety. While the experience of Heimat, which 
emphasized local particularities, may seem incompatible with a larger sense of national 
unity, Heimat actually linked people’s everyday experiences, however different, with a 
larger sense of Germanness as the German Reich in the 19th century secured its place in 
popular allegiance in contrast to earlier, premodern forms of estate-based affiliation and 
old regime political roles within the estates as a subject of the two leading estates. 
German patriotism’s regional variance was perhaps most evident in Bavaria in the 
years after the Second Reich came into existence. After German unification, as part of the 
genius of Bismarck’s constitution, “state ministries of education had full authority to 
determine curricula and approve textbooks for the elementary schools of their states.”99 
Rather than establishing a common, centralized German historiography on, say, the 
French or Hungarian models of the 1880s or so, and definition of patriotism, the 
curriculum in Bavaria reflected its own particularities drawn from tradition. For example, 
it was not required to adorn each classroom with Germany’s ruling Kaiser, Wilhelm II.100 
Even in the early 1890s, the “cult of the regional monarch” in Bavaria overshadowed “the 
imperial cult,” which became aggravated in the 1890s.101 Bavarian textbooks often 
glorified historic Bavarian rulers and omitted certain Prussian aspects of German 
unification, as one might expect, and had previously been the case with Habsburg with 
Bavaria’s leading role in the First Empire.102 In fact, several years after German 
unification, the Bavarian Minister of Education, Johann von Lutz, had to remind 
provincial officials teaching a curriculum that “Bavaria was no longer an independent 
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country.”103 As Abigail Green notes of Hans-Michael Körner’s work on Bavarian history 
lessons, “the efforts of the Bavarian government to promote a sense of the state as a 
meaningful cultural unit actually intensified over time.”104 Though Bavarian curricula 
still emphasized Bavarian history in the early 1900s, students learned that history as an 
integral part of Germany’s historiography. Rather than being forced to accept a Prussian-
centric account of German history, nationalist curriculum came from teachers within 
Bavaria, who were likely swept up in the rising current of German nationalism, and 
wanted to teach Bavarian history in this context.105 
Heimat also forged German unification through its politicization of citizens. Early 
nationalists transformed the concept of Heimat from an apolitical term associated with 
the locality (such as its beauty) to a term that became an explicit tool, allowing the nation 
state to extend its political reach as was the norm in the age of the nation state. Even by 
the mid-1820s, Heimat allowed the Bavarian, and by extension the German state, to 
“reproduce itself at the local level.”106 By the early 1830s, Bavarian statesmen were 
praising the romantic image of the hometown while also leveraging its appeal for 
political purposes.107 Romanticism and the Biedermeier epoch were closely linked. 
Bavarian politicians further used Heimat in order to “obscure any chasms between small 
local worlds and the larger ones to which the locality belonged.”108 Heimat’s cultural 
appeal was matched by the political utility it provided Bavarian and later German 
politicians who used it as a bridge between the nation state and the local.  
B. EXPLOITING CULTURAL REGIONALISM (1933–1945) 
The image of Germany and its regions was radicalized in National Socialism, and 
the fact that the movement had its chief origins in Bavaria is of great relevance for this 
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inquiry. After Germany’s massive mobilization of the First World War and its subsequent 
defeat, Germans longed for the spirit of 1914 and people’s community in the face of 
defeat and the deprivations of the years 1918–1923. While the organic, apolitical 
attachment to Heimat may have been overtaken by a growing nationalization of many 
Germans, the identification with regional polities had remained a strong factor in the 
interwar period. The two schools of thought posed no contradiction for most with a 
nationalist bent, whereas as those who looked to a supranational idea of communism or 
Catholicism, or Zionism were at odds with such an ideal.  
Unlike much of post-World War II historiography which tends to characterize the 
Nazi regime as “national, monolithic and driven by the singular will of the Führer,”109 
the internal structure of the Nazi state was never as unitary as it professed to be, and the 
role of Bavaria in the epoch until 1933 as well as thereafter speaks amply to this fact.  
While many aspects of Nazi Germany did become increasingly centralized, 
regional particularisms were initially accommodated and widely tolerated in order to 
increase support for the Nazi regime. That many of the leading Nazis were Bavarians and 
continued to embody an attachment to home and hearth, as well as a not even thinly 
veiled particularism is a truth to any serious student of the Third Reich. Hitler’s patience 
with Julius Streicher in Franconia is an example of this out of many that can be said to 
have existed in the Third Reich, where particularism in a brown shirt well thrived beneath 
the glittering exterior of the regime seen each September in Nuremberg at the party 
congress.  
Even in lower Bavaria, which was among the least supportive districts for the 
NSDAP, nearly 40 percent of Bavarians cast their vote for the NSDAP on 5 March 1933, 
only four days before the coup which deposed the Bavarian Land government.110 There 
was no significant opposition to Hitler’s leadership by 1935.111 In order to expand his 
political power, Hitler leveraged the German attachment to spatial identity and the 
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associated regional party institutions to create a hybrid regime that had elements of both 
centralism and regionalism. 
1. Location-Based Identity in Nazi Germany 
The Nazi regime understood that Germans identified strongly with their locality 
and region. To be sure, the organization of the party state in the Third Reich was 
centralized, the new Gaue, which replaced the traditional sub divisions of the nation state 
on the total party principle, generously and completely borrowed from past practice about 
regionalism. This role especially was to the benefit of Bavaria, which had a pride of place 
as the home of National Socialism and the site of its most sacred events, although Berlin 
and Prussia also formed a significant part of the Nazi pantheon and historical heritage. 
The Nazis could easily adopt the term Heimat to gain popular regional appeal. Like a 
Trojan horse, the Nazis used Heimat’s established appeal, which invoked rural and moral 
ideals, to introduce their more radical, anti-liberal ideology as set against urban areas and 
cosmopolitan Jews and others who had no Heimat and never could have a Heimat. As 
Celia Applegate notes, “whatever independence from the state the idea of Heimat still 
had by the end of French occupation [after World War I], they lost after 1933.”112 
Regional identities played an important part in constituting support for Nazi power; it 
was the Nazi’s ability to accommodate regional diversity that allowed Germans with 
strong regional attachments to support an inherently nationalist party.  
While the Nazi regime outlawed other political parties, viewing them as a threat 
to their power, it allowed for cultural variation across German Gaue, or Nazi superior 
regional administrative districts under the party’s Reichsleitung.113 For example, the 
Gauleiter in Gau Schwaben, Karl Wahl, exploited the particular sense of Bavarian 
Swabian (versus Württemberger Swabians) as an integral part of a pluralistic German 
Volk, consisting of several German tribes and the ancient constituent clans of Bavaria in 
the Middle Ages.114 Thus, the cultural particularism of this section of Bavaria’s Heimat 
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was tolerated and leveraged in order to promote an integrative character of German Gaue 
and regions. Unlike the early German romantic, Johann Gottfried von Herder, who 
viewed nations as unique but equal, Hitler associated the nation with racial and cultural 
supremacy and executed racist policies to prevent racial degeneration.115 If you were not 
part of the German Volk, you were violently excluded or eliminated from the “local and 
regional Volksgemeinschaft.”116 Bavarians, however, were among the leaders in creating 
this policy and Bavarians flourished in many aspects in their Gaue and their respective 
roles in the III. Reich, so that none of the separatism that festered in the Weimar Republic 
operated at all.  
2. Demystifying Nazi Centralism  
Bavarians were largely opposed to a Prussianized version of German nationalism 
and did not view Bavarian expressions of regional identities as incompatible with 
Germanness. Rather than homogenizing German regions into one form of Prussian-
dominated nationalism, Hitler viewed sub-state allegiance as an integral part of what 
constituted the whole web of German nationalism and used his appeal to emotions and 
identity to further increase his influence.117 Thus, he articulated his view of “Berlin as the 
heart of a distinctly Prussian region, with its own authentic traditions, which can happily 
coexist with the peculiarities of other German regions.”118 The Nazi regime attempted to 
forge German unity “without surrendering the personalities of the regions, and to create 
plurality without particularism.”119 While Hitler did not reject the Volkish ideas of early 
nationalist writers such as Johann Gottfried Herder who promoted the idea of a common 
German Volk united in spirit in language, Hitler understood that he would more 
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effectively gain regional support by “leveraging pride in regional folklore and customs” 
for his political agenda.120  
While Hitler’s regime did have many elements of central control, such as the 
Reich Ministry for Information and Propaganda,121 these centralizing measures were 
developed because for these measures they were the most practical manner to implement 
his increasingly radical visions. The Nazi state, or nation state, was constructed on dual 
pillars of the existing national and Länder bureaucracy as well as the NSDAP national 
territorial structure of Reichsleitung downward to the city block. Hitler understood that 
the former Länder, the traditional heirs of what had been the political order of the First 
Reich, were the most practical way to achieve his political objectives. The Nazi seizure of 
power worked in large measure through these very Länder governments, which became 
vehicles of dictatorship. Since 1934, Hitler began diminishing the role of the 
Reichstatthalter (Reich Governor), who were associated with the central state as they 
reported to the Interior Ministry, in favor of the Gauleiter, who were the senior regional 
NSDAP provincial leaders versus the Kreisleiter, Ortsgruppenleiter and Blockleiter.122 
The Gauleiter often had more direct access to the Führer than did the Reichstatthalter.123 
Thus, Hitler could more effectively communicate his desires through his direct regional 
party representatives rather than through the more bureaucratic side of the Nazi party 
state which retained former ministerial structures with a continuity of personnel from the 
pre 1933 regime. Accordingly, many Gauleiter also served as Reichstatthalter. By 1938, 
at which time the Gleichschaltung had been completed and Hitler was Führer in full 
glory, the supremacy of the Gauleiter over regional state officials was clearly evident in a 
letter written by Josef Bürckel, of left Rhenish Bavaria (Pfalz) who refused to take orders 
from any Reich Ministry official.124 While the Nazi state is hard to categorize, 
particularly as it varied over space and time, by 1940, the role of the Reichstatthalter and 
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the Gauleiter in several regions had been incorporated into a single person who often 
reported directly from his region to the Führer himself.125 
C. RETURN TO REGIONALISM (1945–PRESENT) 
After the Second World War, the Allied governments and West German political 
actors decried the perils of German centralization and sought to institute a federal 
structure containing strong autonomous regions. Advocates of regionalism in both East 
and West Germany argued that their Heimat was only a “victim of the crimes of the past 
12 years” and never an “accessory” to them even if this description omitted the large 
popular support of the Nazi party in many German regions in the south and in the east.126 
While certain Bavarians could well assert that may have been more resistant than other 
German regions towards the NSDAP, large minorities of Germans had cast their vote for 
the Hitler’s party as early as September of 1930, from 12 percent in Lower Bavaria to 
27 percent in Schleswig-Holstein.127 Despite Bavaria and many other regions’ open 
support or not for the Nazi regime and varied regional levels of support for a Prussian-led 
German unification,128 allied policy-makers largely oversimplified the regional 
differences in Germany, other than breaking Austria free of the Reich, blamed the 
Prussian state as “always having been a bearer of militarism…in Germany” and 
effectively dissolved Prussia.129 This fact ignored in 1947 that Prussians until 1932 had 
done more to resist Nazi encroachment on German democracy than had other Länder in 
the Weimar Republic. Germans and allies alike viewed a kind of democratic rediscovery 
of particularism as the building blocks of German society that could rid Germany from 
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the legacy of Nazism and restore healthy social and political mores.130 Such was 
especially the case with the rise of Christian Democracy in West Germany, with its 
Rhenish and Bavarian centers of gravity in the new Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 
The allies did not need to artificially create regions—although they made the new states 
of Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine Westphalia (even if Germany did experience 
revisions to its territory after both World Wars), but with the order to the constitutional 
authors at Chiemsee to create a new federal and democratic order they succeeded in 
reviving this federal structure in a manner that seemed less than possible when such work 
began in 1948. The result was the restoration of Länder regional governments that 
eventually emerged as strong, political, social, and economic actors under a federal 
framework.  
1. Protection of Bavaria’s Regional Autonomy in Germany’s Post-War 
Institutional Framework 
The U.S. military government, not the least because many in its number were 
German émigrés in olive drab, with a deep knowledge of the German past, understood 
Bavaria’s unique cultural and political particularities and sought to empower Bavaria as a 
region within a newly established German Federation as soon as practicable. Further, 
Bavaria in the American mind embodied what Franklin Roosevelt held up as the pre-
industrial, anti-Prussian Germany of before 1871, which he recalled from his youth. 
Rather than dictating how the Bavarians should govern themselves, the U.S. Military 
Government established a legal framework that permitted Bavarians to rule themselves, 
only intervening when required to prevent extremism.131 The authors of the Basic Law 
met also in Bavaria in 1948 to work on the document, which imbibed the genius of the 
location, with the tolerance and measure that had characterized Bavaria in its best 
moments in the 19th century and even in the old Reich, while fully eschewing the sources 
of totalitarian extremist of the early 20th century as visible in such men as Hitler, 
Himmler and Streicher.  
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Once the Basic Law took shape and the FRG came into existence, the strongest 
constitutional framework that enshrined regional rights in the post-Second World War 
Period was the establishment of the Bundesrat in the West German Basic Law. This other 
house of the West German parliament paid tribute to the Länder and their role in 
parliamentary democracy, and also took more than a page from the former constitutions 
houses of the estates and nobles reaching back to the First Reich.  
Established in 1949 under the purview of Allied military control, the Bundesrat 
was re-established to create a federal model, which could protect regional autonomy from 
centralization and allow a place for regional politics in the young FRG.132 However, 
rather than just being an executive form of territorial representation as it existed under the 
First German Reich, the Bundesrat was now a representative “chamber within the federal 
parliament” endowed with the necessary constitutional protections in the Basic Law that 
prohibited the over centralization of government power that had begun in 1914 and 
reached its awful climax after 1933.133  
While some aspects of West German industry and labor had experienced 
centralizing tendencies beginning in the late 1950s and continuing through the 1980s,134 
political and cultural regionalism have remained strong forces that have substantiated the 
protection of Länder autonomy in the Basic Law and have shaped the relationship 
between the federal government and the regions.  
Central to the core of the FRG in its infancy until about 1963 was Christian 
Democracy and Social Democracy, both as anti-communist answers to the past and 
present. The heart of Christian Democracy in its two variations, the Christian Democratic 
Union and the Christian Social Union, were the Rhineland and Bavaria. Analyzing how 
the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), which has governed Bavaria for the vast 
majority of post-Second World War history, has been integrated into the FRG while at 
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the same time maintaining strong regional affiliation provides insight into why Bavaria 
has not sought secession.  
The CSU has achieved and maintained considerate political and cultural 
autonomy since its founding in 1945 out of the tradition of Catholic and Bavarian 
particularist parties that had formerly existed. The CSU has mobilized the territorial 
attachment of Bavarians to create a unique party. The CSU, a sister party of the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) that operates in the remaining German Länder, may be 
understood, in addition to its anti-Nazi, Bonn is not Weimar role, also as a “nationalist 
party that seeks to secure an autonomous Bavarian Heimat.”135 However, while the CSU 
seeks to defend Bavarian interests, it has not pursued independence from Germany as 
may have been the case in earlier times; rather it has “supported a strong type of 
federalism, based on maximum decentralization of authority to the Länder and a more 
powerful Bundesrat.”136 Furthermore, while it defends regional autonomy in the 
Bundesrat, it has also leveraged its connection and power within the CDU as a mirror of 
Bavaria’s role in the political culture of the FRG overall in order to into “participate in 
federal politics…and to fill Cabinet posts.”137 The CSU’s political success at both the 
Land and federal level is reflected by its ability to command over half of the vote since 
1969.138 In summary, though Bavaria maintains no special status in the German 
constitution,139 the FRG has successfully accommodated Bavarian political and cultural 
regionalism, mitigating any strong secessionist tendencies. 
2. How Bavaria’s Economic Transformation Reinforced its Regional 
Particularity 
Bavaria’s economic transformation in the years following the Second World War 
enabled Bavaria to assert its cultural and political regionalism, which have likely 
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mitigated strong calls for Bavarian secession, in two ways. First, “fiscal responsibilities 
were divided between the Federal Government and the various Länder.”140 This feature 
allowed for Bavaria to adopt policies and solutions to its particular problems. 
Additionally, the significant degree of economic autonomy allowed for regional 
governments to support local industries.141 At the same time, the federal framework was 
tailored for “neoliberal, noninterventionist policies” that allowed for regional diversity.142 
This setup allowed for small and midsized regionally-oriented producers, which often 
specialized in local crafts to coexist with larger, private industrial firms.143 Traditional 
businesses were not subsumed by the introduction of large-scale industrialization. Rather 
local governments mediated economic development and helped promote a sense of inter-
firm collaboration.144 While the post-Second World War FRG economic structure did 
allow for market capitalism, West German capitalism of the social market economy 
emerged as a distinct form of capitalism that did not eliminate regional social and 
political traditions; Bavaria remained distinctly Bavarian.  
Second, Bavaria benefited significantly from the timing of its industrialization, 
which in turn reinforced Bavarian regionalism by strengthening its economy. From the 
creation of the German state to the Second World War, Bavaria’s economy remained 
largely agricultural and less commercialized than most other German regions.145 Because 
of this, Bavaria benefited greatly from the technology transfer it inherited or adapted 
from German or foreign sources.146 The eclipse of Berlin as well as of Saxony as high 
tech and industrial cores of the Second and Third Reichs, meant in the early cold war a 
great benefit for Bavaria, especially as concerned the auto and aerospace branches. As 
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companies began relocating to Bavaria, many Germans were lifted out of poverty.147 
Ethnic Germans, who were displaced or expelled from their homes in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, flocked to Bavaria to take advantage of this economic opportunity, 
filling auto, aerospace and arms factories and strengthening Bavaria’s economy while 
supporting its regional particularity which also greatly profited from the rise of European 
tourism, where parts of Bavaria that had suffered in poverty became prosperous from 
mass tourism that became the norm from the 1950s onwards. 
D. CONCLUSION 
German regionalism during the mid- to late-19th century coalesced to become an 
integrating force for national unity. Rather than subjugating Bavaria, a region with 
cultural and political institutions that had initially resisted German unification, Prussia 
incorporated it as an integral part of the German Reich. Bavarian cultural identity did not 
contradict a larger notion of national unity. Heimat acted as a tool for Bavarians to 
reconcile their regional differences with a larger sense of national identity. Hitler 
understood the appeal of Heimat and leveraged it to solidify his power. By allowing a 
measure of cultural diversity throughout the Länder, he increased his influence, 
facilitating the abolition of political opposition. In the aftermath of the Second World 
War, the allied powers and many Germans called for the restoration and strengthening of 
regional autonomy in order to prevent another “Hitler State.”148 The structure of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which enshrines significant regional autonomy within a 
Federal framework, successfully integrates German regions and allows for cultural and 
political diversity. The tradition of Bavarian regionalism as an integral part of the 
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III. SPANISH REGIONALISM 
The seeds of Catalonian regionalism were planted in an environment similar to 
that of Bavarian regionalism. Catalonia was independent before being incorporated into a 
larger state structure, as was the case with Bavaria. People in both regions had a distinct 
regional identity in addition to a larger notion of national identity. Why then does 
Bavarian regionalism continue to be compatible with German nationalism, whereas 
Catalan regionalism first demanded autonomy and now seeks independence? This chapter 
argues that Castile—due to both deliberate policies and unplanned reasons—never 
effectively integrated Catalonia. While the Spanish empire’s deterioration certainly 
impeded its nation-building objectives, the decline itself was not directly responsible for 
Spain’s failed nation-building project and the rise in Catalonian regionalism.  
This chapter is divided into four thematic sections that interoperate and explain 
how Catalonian regionalism has evolved into a movement seeking sovereignty. First, the 
foundation of Spanish unity was its dynastic union and the pursuit of empire; this delayed 
the need for the Spanish monarchy to build internal solidarity within its regions. For over 
two centuries, Catalonia maintained its own institutions apart from Castile. Second, the 
delayed consolidation of Spanish territories made internal cohesion increasingly difficult, 
often driving Castile to force Catalonia into submission. In turn, this caused Catalonia to 
turn away from Castile. Third, Spain failed to develop a common sense of national 
identity that could overcome regional or political divides. The combination of these 
factors led to the fourth and final theme—the rise of Catalanism, which Raymond Carr 
explains, is the notion that Catalonia is “a separate entity, either of race or of culture and 
tradition, demanding special treatment.”149 Spanish attempts at devolution have been 
insofar unsuccessful in mitigating Catalan demands for independence.  
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A. THE SPANISH EMPIRE: THE WEAK KNOT FOR AN INTERNALLY 
HETEROGENOUS STATE 
Spain’s imperial decline itself was not a direct cause for its failed nation-building 
project and the rise in Catalonian regionalism, but it allowed for regionalist sentiment to 
grow. Each consecutive loss of Spain’s colonies struck a progressively stronger blow at 
the physical and emotional bonds that held Spaniards together. The decline of the empire 
led to a waning sense of solidarity. Small difficulties that Catalonia previously endured in 
exchange for access to imperial markets and potential influence in Madrid became 
increasingly problematic, leading to confrontations between Castile and Catalonia. This 
section explores the foundations of Spain’s empire and assesses the impact that imperial 
losses had on the Spain’s unity.  
1. Tying the Knot: The Foundations of the Empire 
Any sense of shared Spanish identity hinged upon the people’s connection to the 
unified crown and its associated empire, rather than on institutional ties. In 1469, 
Ferdinand of Aragon married Isabella of Castile to form a new dynastic union.150 This 
union, which led to Spain’s greatest power and influence during its golden age (1517 to 
1665), precluded the need for Spanish monarchs to internally consolidate their territories, 
failing to develop a strong notion of national identity.151 Catholicism, the only common 
religious and political institution served as the foundation for the unity of these two 
kingdoms. Furthermore, Catalonia like the other two territories comprising the Aragonese 
crown, maintained its own institutions.152  
One factor that may have created resentment from the start was that Castile was 
the dominant partner in the marriage. The relationship favored Castile, and Castile’s 
political leaders initially made no attempt to integrate Aragonese people or institutions. 
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While the Crown of Aragon in the early 16th century began a slow recovery, “after 
centuries of expansion followed by a period of decay,” beginning a slow recovery, 
Castile, as John Huxtable Elliott notes, entered a “period of economic and military 
expansion.”153 Despite their strength, many Castilian nobles were jealous of the Catalan 
autonomy. Queen Isabella opined, as translated by Elliott, that “it would be better to 
reduce the Aragonese by force than to suffer the arrogance of their Cortes.”154 Though 
she did not forcefully subdue the Kingdom of Aragon, this mentality, likely held by many 
Spanish nobles, reduced the trust between the two kingdoms and hindered future joint 
endeavors. Many Catalans perceived Castile’s attempts at nation-building, regardless of 
Castile’s intentions, as punitive measures. By the second half of the 16th century, 
Castilians were beginning to take the most prominent positions in government, causing 
Catalans, as Elliott explains, to shut “themselves off from any possibility of future co-
operation with the Crown.”155 The economic benefits of the New World also fell largely 
to the Crown of Castile, which administered the American possessions, given that Aragon 
and Castile remained separate but in name only.156  
2. Straining the Knot: The War of Spanish Succession (1702–1714) 
The War of Spanish Succession (1702–1714), an international and civil war over 
the line to the Spanish throne, delivered a major blow to Spain’s empire and cracked the 
weak bonds of unity between Catalonia and Castile. Over a decade of war resulted in, as 
Altamira indicates, “huge losses in men and treasure, and the consequent delays in 
development of national enterprises.”157 Perhaps more importantly, Spain lost a 
significant portion of its empire. Philip V, the successor to the Spanish throne, had to 
relinquish control of Spain’s possession in Italy and Sardinia, which had belonged to the 
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Crown of Aragon, to the Holy Roman Empire.158 Spain also lost Gibraltar and Menorca 
to the British.159 The war bankrupted Spain and destroyed its agriculture and industry.160  
The empire, which acted as a weak basis for internal unity, began to crumble. The 
Spanish Monarchy, rather than building internal solidarity on something other than 
empire, undertook policies that, as Rafael Altamira explains, “plunged Spain into new 
wars which the nation seemed little able to carry on.”161 Another implication of Spain’s 
focus on its overseas empire was that Castile neglected Catalonia’s specific economic 
interests. For example, Castile failed to protect Catalonia’s Mediterranean trade routes 
from pirates, which led to increasingly problematic relations between the two regions.162 
Finally, whereas the Catholic Monarchs Isabella and Ferdinand shared a common enemy, 
namely their perceived threat of Islam and Judaism, by the 18th century Castile and 
Catalonia had no clear sense of common enemies.  
3. The Knot Unravels (1808–1898) 
Spain’s War of Independence (1808–1814) dealt a huge blow to its empire, both 
physically and mentally. Not only did the war demolish its economy, but it also curtailed 
its global influence and prestige.163 Furthermore, Spain’s American colonies were 
beginning to fight for independence, sparking revolutions that a weakened-Spain could 
hardly forestall. By 1825, Spain had lost most of her American colonies.164 With Spain’s 
diminished overseas holdings, Catalonia became more dependent on Iberian markets.165 
In order to achieve cheaper foreign goods, the Spanish state in 1869 enacted free-trade 
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measures—policies that threatened Catalonia’s bourgeoisie, which had until then enjoyed 
state protection from free market forces.166 Despite the severe imperial losses Spain 
suffered in the beginning of the 19th century, these losses would not be as monumental as 
the Spanish American War of 1898.  
The Spanish American War, known in Spain as El Desastre, or The Disaster, 
forever put Spain’s imperial ambitions, the weak knot tying Iberian Spain together, in the 
past.167 More importantly, secessionist movements in Cuba and the Philippines, as Josep 
Fradera explains, threatened Spain’s “credibility in international affairs, a crucial 
component in underpinning state power.”168 Thus, the Catalan bourgeois, who had until 
then benefited from protectionist measures and believed in creating a strong industrial 
state, turned inward, seeking economic diversification to increase their autarky.169 The 
Catalan bourgeoisie, disillusioned by the central government’s weakness, positioned 
itself as an alternative source of political and cultural identity.  
4. Failed Attempts to Retie the Knot (1909–1942) 
Early attempts to recover from El Desastre backfired. In 1909, when reservists 
were mobilized to reinforce Spanish troops fighting in Morocco, a popular uprising in 
Barcelona threw the town into a week of anarchy.170 Spanish Prime Minister Antonio 
Maura responded harshly, executing five of those presumed responsible.171 Maura, facing 
increasing opposition for his response to what became known as the Tragic Week in 
Catalonia, was forced to resign and could no longer implement his “conservative nation-
                                                 
166 Hansen, Rural Catalonia, 45..; Carr, Spain, 11.; The free trade policies would be revoked in 1891 
under growing Catalan pressure, as Carr explains on page 539.  
167 Josep M. Fradera, “The Empire, The Nation and the Homelands: Nineteenth-Century Spain’s 
National Idea,” in Region and State in Nineteenth-century Europe: Nation-Building, Regional Identities 
and Separatism, ed. Joost Augusteijn and Eric Storm (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 144. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Hansen, Rural Catalonia, 51. 
170 Eric Storm, “The Problems of the Spanish Nation-Building Process around 1900,” National 
Identities 6, no. 2 (2004): 151. 
171 Ibid. 
 42
building” programs, even if the Moroccan campaign was a nominal success.172 The 
Tragic Week became a mobilizing cause for Catalanism and an impediment to mobilizing 
Catalans in support of Spain’s national projects.173 
A final attempt at recovering from the progressive loss of Spanish colonies 
occurred during the Second World War. While Spain officially remained neutral, Franco, 
who had received support from the Nazi regime during the Spanish Civil War, believed 
in, as Stanley G. Payne notes, “retaining what little remained of the Spanish Empire, and 
of adding to it as circumstances permitted.”174 The view Franco and his regime had on 
Spain’s empire is evident in an article written in a Falangist newspaper written on 1 April 
1942, published in Jaen, which states: 
España cuando regó con su sangre las rutas del mundo, recogió la cosecha 
de su imperio. Pero la grandeza ganada con la sangro de aquellas gloriosas 
generaciones fue despilfarrada porque otras sin temple y sin nervio, a la 
sombra plácida del rico botín regatearon cobardes la que preciso verter 
para mantener integra la enorme herencia. 
[As Spain watered the routes of the world with its blood it harvested 
results in its empire. Nonetheless the greatness achieved by the blood of 
those glorious generations was frittered away as those who followed 
lacked the nerve and determination to maintain that heritage, preferring 
instead to relax in the comfort of accumulated treasure, they failed to carry 
out that necessary investment.]175 
Franco viewed the Blue Division, a group of Spanish volunteers, some of whom 
were pressured, as the embodiment of Spain’s blood, glory, and spirit, capable of 
expanding Spain’s values and influence in Europe. Franco deployed these soldiers to the 
Eastern Front to fight against an atheist Communist regime to defend what he viewed as 
Spain’s romanticized conservative and catholic past. Whereas propaganda of the time 
insisted that Iberian blood would not freeze on the Eastern Front, the reality was that 
                                                 
172 Storm, “The Problems of the Spanish Nation-Building,” 152. 
173 Ibid., 153. 
174 Stanley G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008), 11. 
175 Diario de Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S, Jaén, Spain, April 1, 1942, 7. Quote 
translated by author.  
 43
many volunteers were dying of frostbite, if not due to sickness or battlefield 
casualties.176As the tide of war turned toward the Allies, Franco distanced himself from 
the Nazi regime.177 Franco’s quest for empire could no longer be used as a tool to unite 
Spaniards given Hitler’s fall from power and the development of the post-Second World 
War international framework, which reflected the principles of democracy and rejected 
imperialism.178  
B. CASTILIAN HEGEMONY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CATALONIAN IDENTITY 
Deliberate centralizing policies enacted by Castile and perhaps more importantly 
how they were perceived and then recalled by Catalans, led to continuously problematic 
relations between the two regions and created a schism that Catalan nationalists would 
begin exploiting in the last part of the 19th century. The increasingly distrustful 
relationship between Castile and Catalonia and the differing visions each had on the 
nature of the Spanish state led to almost persistent conflict, beginning at least as early as 
the 1640s when Catalans revolted against the Spanish crown. Castile began to view 
Catalonia as a threat, regardless of whether or not it was. Likewise, Catalonia viewed 
Castile’s centralizing efforts, as tools to oppress Catalonia’s cultural and political 
identity. This section explores how Spain’s attempts to centralize the state led to 
antagonistic relations between Castile and Catalonia. Understanding this section provides 
context for the next section, which explains why no shared sense of Spanish nationality 
emerged. 
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1. Early Attempts at Centralization 
The first attempts at economic centralization took place under the reign of 
Charles V (1516–1556).179 The Spanish state, in the midst of the growing economic 
burdens of imperial expansion and military conflict, and not to mention the increasingly 
rebellious territory of the Spanish Netherlands, looked inward to raise taxes.180 While 
Castile was paying for nearly three quarters of the economic costs of Spain’s empire in 
the early 16th century, Aragon was paying for only one percent.181 While Spanish kings 
could bypass the Court in Castile to impose taxes, Aragon’s strong constraints on 
monarchical power prevented Spanish kings from extracting resources from Aragon 
without the consent of its Courts.182 This would lead to a confrontation in which 
Charles’s successor, Philip IV, would send his advisor, Count-Duke of Olivares, to force 
Catalonia to contribute to Spain’s empire economically and to provide soldiers for 
Spain’s army.183  
Count-Duke Olivares’s efforts to compel Catalonia to contribute to state coffers 
and policies, beginning in 1622, clashed with Catalonia’s closely regarded political 
autonomy and led to increasingly problematic relations between Madrid and 
Barcelona.184 Additionally, Count-Duke Olivares used Catalonia as a staging ground for 
Spain’s war against France in 1639.185 He forced Catalonia to contribute troops to 
support the King’s war, causing widespread resentment. Additionally, he used the 
presence and quartering of troops to compel the Catalan Cortes (Catalan parliament) to 
contribute money to the state treasury.186 Olivares’s policies were rejected by the 
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Aragonese Cortes and the people, who murdered the Spanish Crown’s regional official, 
Santa Coloma, and revolted against the Crown’s presence in Aragon.187  
The Spanish Crown ultimately subdued the region by force. However, the 
division between the Kingdom of Aragon and Castile became obvious. Portuguese 
nobles, after witnessing this discord, declared their independence from Spain in 1640.188 
In 1659, after years of fighting, Spanish statesmen concluded the war with France.189 
Spanish authorities ceded some Catalan territory to France but cemented their juridical 
authority over the remainder of Catalonia.190  
The War of Spanish Succession (1702–1714) resulted in the loss of Catalonia’s 
institutions. The war, which was instigated by rival claims to the Spanish crown, left 
Catalonia and Castile on opposing sides. Castilian nobles supported Philip V while 
Catalonia’s aristocrats supported Archduke Charles. Philip V, who acceded to the throne, 
abolished Catalonia’s long-established constitution in what are known as the Nueva 
Planta decrees in retribution for having sided with Charles.191 He replaced Catalonian 
laws with Castilian ones, seeking to establish a centralized form of government.192  
2. Castilian Language becomes Anti-Catalan  
Until the mid-17th century, Catalan, Castilian and Latin were used 
interchangeably in court documents.193 Even in everyday communication, many people 
often switched between these languages without, as David Laitin explains, “traumas of 
any sort.”194 After the establishment of Spanish juridical authority over Catalonia in 
1659, Catalan elites understood that in order to win court cases, which would now be 
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resolved in Castilian courts, they had to become masters of formal Castilian and be 
familiar with Castilian culture.195 While the use of Catalan never disappeared, 
particularly among the masses, fluency in formal Castilian had become increasingly 
widespread in the latter half of the 17th century. By the beginning of the 18th century, 
fluency in Castilian was perceived by many Catalans as a sign of refinement and class.196 
Even during the War of Spanish Succession, more than 90 percent of the anti-Philip 
propaganda was written in Castilian, illustrating that Catalans did not initially associate 
the use of Castilian as being anti-Catalan.197 The consequences of the war of Spanish 
Succession (1702–1714) drastically changed the perception of Castilian in the eyes of 
many Catalans.  
Despite the de facto practice in which Catalans used Castilian in court cases, the 
Nueva Planta decrees mandated the use of Castilian. This requirement to exclusively use 
Castilian turned the language into more than a medium of communication; it helped 
Catalans became more aware of their own language, which Catalans increasingly 
identified with.198 Though it would not be until the second half of the 19th century for the 
Catalan masses to feel a distinct sense of nationhood, Catalan nationalists used the Nueva 
Planta decrees and the language divide to help mobilize the masses towards their political 
aims. The language battle between Castilian and Catalan continues to this day.199  
3. The Failed Hopes of 1812  
Perhaps the most potential for constructing a modern Spanish state that 
incorporated the role of historical regions such as Catalonia, while maintaining Spanish 
unity, was during the aftermath of the Spanish War of Independence. Regional 
governments and resistance movements played a role, however consequential, in 
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expelling French forces in the absence of the Spanish monarchy. Fernando VII, with the 
support of the army, deposed Carlos IV for his unpopular policies and alliance with the 
French in March of 1808. 200 While the Spanish government had initially supported the 
French in a war against Portugal, France later invaded Spain. Napoleon forced Fernando 
VII out of power in favor of his brother, Joseph Napoleon Bonaparte.201 The rise of 
juntas, or local councils, in the midst of the Spanish government’s collapse, led some to 
believe that the constitution of 1812 would reflect the prominence of regional decision-
making structures in the new government. The new constitution, however, failed to 
incorporate the role juntas undertook in the civil war and also neglected the political 
institutions of historical regions, such as Catalonia. 
Perhaps the most important legacy of 19th century liberalism was, as Raymond 
Carr explains, that liberals, 
in spite of lip-service to the ideal of the medieval municipality, accepted 
two propositions: that the Cortes, as ‘sole representative of the sovereign 
nation,’ must enforce a uniform and centralized system and that, within 
this system, the municipalities were ‘subaltern corporations.’ This 
conception of the relationship between local and central government, 
derived from the French model, stamped the whole subsequent history of 
Spain.202 
The destruction of historical regions, such as Catalonia, and their replacement by 
centrally-controlled administrative regions was a vision held by many liberals and some 
conservatives.203 These Spaniards sought to establish not only political unity, but also to 
consolidate Spain’s culturally distinct regions in order to transform Spain into a modern 
state.204 Despite the nominal presence of administrative regions, including Catalonia, in 
political coalitions throughout the 19th century, Catalonian elites were largely 
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underrepresented and excluded from decision-making processes in Madrid.205 The 
differences between the liberal ideals of the constitution, which promised inclusive and 
equal representation, and the shortcomings of its de facto implementation undermined the 
relationship between the Catalonia and the state. Growing challenges came not only from 
politicians in Madrid who advocated for a federal state, given the historic autonomy of 
the various Spanish kingdoms, but also from the periphery.206  
Catalan nationalists began to condemn the liberal state’s failure to address local 
Catalan interests and viewed centralized liberalism as another tool to destroy Catalonia’s 
historic political institutions.207 In a literary work written in 1843, titled Recuerdos y 
Bellezas de España, or Memories and Memories of Spain, the Catalan authors criticize 
Spanish statesmen who were making the whole country uniform and destroying sacred 
local traditions.208 Most Catalan regionalists in the mid-19th century did not demand 
independence but rather that Madrid respect Catalonia’s unique cultural and political 
identity.209 Many Catalan elites, as Angel Smith notes, argued that “regional patriotic 
sentiment would both feed into and also enhance Spanish national identity.”210  
However, Spain’s governments in the 1850s continued to view Catalonia as a 
threat, sometimes equating criticism with rebellion and evoking the revolt of the Catalans 
of 1640 in order to justify their policies.211 Madrid responded to perceived Catalonian 
threats by increasing centralization and military rule over Barcelona.212 Thus, Catalans 
nationalists began looking away from Castile and to Catalonia’s past—to its ancient 
institutions—as an inspiration for Catalonia’s future.213  
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4. Francoist Spain 1939–1975  
Francisco Franco, who ruled Spain from 1939 to 1975, centralized Spain into a 
unitary state, even though he embraced the use of some regional iconography in 
legitimizing his regime. While Franco’s regime recalled the greatness and unity of Spain 
under Queen Isabella of Castile and King Ferdinand of Aragon, he abolished any political 
regionalism that threatened his vision of a unitary Spain. Franco viewed regional 
separatism, and especially Catalanism, as a threat to Spanish unity and carried out a 
nationalist program that suppressed Catalan identity, language, and Catalan 
institutions.214 As Carmen Ortiz explains, Franco’s regime tried to legitimize its 
centralization of power by basing its legitimacy on unity of the Spanish people 
symbolized by the Spanish peasant.215 Yet the contradictions between the regime’s 
rhetoric and its policies were apparent. In Catalonia, Franco required the Institute for 
Catalan Studies to be renamed the Institute for Mediterranean Studies and ensured that 
any folklore or cultural studies did not pose a challenge to his regime.216  
Despite Franco’s attempts to homogenize Spain, he could not eliminate Catalan 
regionalism. The only place where some degree of regime-independent, social interaction 
could take place was in the Catholic Church of Catalonia.217 Ironically, Franco’s regime, 
which fused Catholicism with nationalism, allowed Catalan regionalism to seek refuge in 
the Catalan Catholic Church, an institution that Catalanism had previously rejected.218 
Through the Church, as Andrew Dowling notes, Catalanism practiced a strategy of 
accumulating “small concessions, which through their piecemeal nature the regime found 
difficult to rescind.”219  
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More importantly, Catalan regionalism spread to larger audiences and emerged as 
a strong political and cultural movement by the end of Franco’s regime. While Franco did 
provide some decades of political stability and economic progress as well as 
improvements in literacy, his authoritarian rule became synonymous with Spanish 
national identity and regional identities only became more resistant to national 
integration.220 As Hansen noted, writing in 1977, the Catalan people, regardless of their 
class, felt like a “people alienated from Spain and sorely oppressed by the central 
government.”221 Thus, the regime’s centralizing policies provoked a strong opposition 
from Spain’s regions, particularly in Catalonia, a sentiment that would be leveraged for 
building political regionalism and demanding autonomy in the decades following 
Franco’s rule. 
C. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A COMMON NATIONAL VISION  
In the aftermath of the Spanish American War, in which Spain lost its colonies, 
the future integrity of Iberian Spain was at stake. Given the deterioration of Spain’s 
empire, it became increasingly important to establish a shared sense of national identity 
that could keep peninsular Spain together. However, as discussed in the previous section, 
the hopes of a constitutional nation failed to materialize. Problems that could have 
previously been resolved without much difficulty reemerged and were now perceived as 
“intolerable” given that the feeling of national solidarity had disintegrated.222 The failure 
to establish a strong common cultural understanding, or Kulturnation, allowed for 
Catalonian identity to increasingly become a separate and exclusive one that closely 
aligned with political independence.  
Despite more than three centuries of statehood by 1800, Spain remained a 
heterogeneous society with varying laws, languages, currencies, weights and measures, 
customs duties, and jurisdictions—all challenges to the development of a common 
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understanding of the Spanish nation.223 The Spanish author Pablo de Olavide, writing in 
the late 18th century remarked that “each province, each school, each profession 
focuse[d] on itself, forgetting the rest of the nation.”224 Rather than feeling as Spanish 
citizens, everyone only thought of themselves and how they were different from 
others.225 By the late 18th century, social divides remained very clear-cut even between a 
growing middle class that had become wealthy and the aristocracy, with few institutions, 
organizations, or ideologies to bridge social divides.226 Thus, the country became subject 
to the competing factions of small bodies and classes fighting against each other.227 As 
Javier Varela points out, “love for one’s fatherland [was] extinguished and the idea of the 
nation never [took] root.”228  
Failed attempts at homogenizing the masses in the 19th century were rooted in 
several sources. Perhaps the most problematic was Spain’s ineffective educational 
system. The municipal governments, starting in 1857, were responsible for elementary 
education.229 Often underfunded, these schools had a limited ability to improve Spain’s 
literacy rate.230 One official estimate in the same year calculated that there was a shortage 
of 27,000 schools in Spain.231 Consequently, Spanish citizens could not feel the benefits 
of state-run schools that could have developed in them a sense of common civic loyalty. 
Likewise, the state could not effectively use schools to inculcate civic or cultural patriotic 
values into its youth. Spain’s literacy rate in the mid-19th century was under 25 percent 
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and even by 1900, less than half of the population could read or write.232 The fact that 
most Spaniards could not read or write likely helped foster a climate of corruption in 
local government officials, given that citizens had little understanding of government 
laws and were thus unable to stand up for their rights and hold state administrators 
accountable.  
After El Desastre of 1898, the public increasingly began to demand educational 
reform as a method to prevent national degeneration.233 If this collective realization had 
come in the midst of the Spanish War of Independence, it may have been more 
successful; however, by the early 20th century, the animosity between competing 
political parties and ideologies had reached a boiling point. There could still be no 
consensus on the character of national education, as an ideological divide between “neo-
catholicism and anticlericalism” hampered attempts at finding common ground to 
develop a national educational program.234 This failure to achieve consensus undoubtedly 
limited the degree to which a common Spanish national idea could be shared by the 
inhabitants of its territory. Moreover, the Catholic Church, an institution that often 
marked the dividing line between liberals and conservatives, ran many of the schools in 
the country during the 19th century.  
Another problem that Spanish nation-building suffered from was the lack of 
national symbols. Cathedrals stood as a monument to a strong Catholic past, but Spanish 
elites could not agree on a new national symbol to mobilize the masses. Unlike Germany, 
there were no large-scale monuments to Spanish unity or resistance to French occupation 
that could rally the masses in support of national aims. Additionally, Spanish nation-
builders failed to capitalize on the national feelings that arose in the midst and in the 
aftermath of the Spanish War of Independence. The war did, however, achieve some 
degree of national unity. Both conservative forces supporting the Catholic Church and the 
King and liberal forces seeking to build a constitutional nation could find solidarity in 
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their struggle against France’s occupation. Francisco Goya’s painting of France’s brutal 
suppression of Madrid’s resistance fighters, which took place on 3 May 1808, helped 
establish a common understanding of the conflict as a war of independence. Yet the 
Spanish nation remained divided about how to reconstruct the state in the war’s 
aftermath. While the conflict may have provided an abstract notion of national unity in 
opposing Napoleon, Spanish nationalists were unsuccessful at mobilizing these feelings 
to develop a program that could achieve some degree of political consensus. The 
constitution of 1812 ended when the deposed King Fernando VII, with the support of the 
Army, abolished the Cortes and returned to power.235 Both conservatives and liberals 
reinterpreted the war throughout the 19th century to fit their political agendas.236 Rather 
than seizing Spanish opposition to French occupation as a basis for building modern 
Spanish nationalism, the country remained divided. Whatever little shared spirit existed 
in the struggle against French occupation faded, leaving Spanish nation-builders unable 
to forge a sword of modern Spanish nationalism that could unify Spain culturally and 
provide a basis for national projects. Yet Catalan nationalists would establish a national 
Catalan day in the late 19th century that recalled Barcelona’s struggle against Castilian 
occupation.237 Failure to establish a middle ground or consensus on how to organize the 
Spanish state would lead to multiple conflicts throughout the 19th century.238 
Continual turmoil, fueled by ideological divides, hampered Spanish nation-
building throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries by conflicting ideologies. Placing 
the Patria, or Fatherland, above class or political divides was not successful given that 
there were no strong voluntary associations or patriotic groups that glorified the Spanish 
nation. The Spanish state had existed for centuries and modern Spanish nation-builders 
only began to seriously recognize the need to adopt a new national program in the 
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aftermath of El Desastre of 1898.239 However, Catalan nation-building had already begun 
in earnest before the 20th century. By the second half of the 19th century, there was a 
surge in Catalan regionalism as evidenced by the rise in regionalist associations.240 These 
Catalan associations focused on regional culture and developed the idea of a cultural 
nation, or Kulturnation, which overcame class divides and formed a basis from which 
liberal and conservative Catalanists could negotiate, even if their ideology was separate. 
In 1888, Catalanists supported the construction of a statue of Rafael Casanova, a Catalan 
hero wounded by Castilian forces in the War of Spanish Succession.241 Conflicts between 
Spanish authorities and Catalanists over this statue represented a larger societal divide. In 
order to help solidify regionalist sentiment, Catalan nationalists, as Carr notes, “invented 
the fiction of a Castilian ‘nationalism,’ of a dominant Spanish state.”242 Catalan cultural 
solidarity presented a challenge to Spanish nation-builders, who were delayed in 
developing any similar sense of cultural unity.  
Spanish efforts at developing a sense of citizenship in the form of a constitutional 
nation, or Verfassungsnation, were hindered by continual political conflict, government 
instability prior to Franco’s rule, and the absence of valued state institutions that all 
Spaniards could appreciate. The Army, beginning with Count-Duke Olivares and 
continuing through until Franco, became an institution associated with the Monarchy, the 
Church, and military dictatorships and was therefore less popular among liberal 
Spaniards and Catalanists. Rather than acting as a unifying, state institution, it acted for 
some time as an ideological force to support conservatism. As Eric Storm explains, a 
system of political clientelism developed in the 19th century, which led ordinary citizens 
to view the “state in a negative way.”243 Paying taxes did not guarantee the construction 
of local infrastructure. As Storm explains, the building of local projects, whether it be a 
                                                 
239 Boyd, Historia Patria, 41. 
240 Hansen, Rural Catalonia, 52. 
241 Kathryn Crameri, “‘We Need Another Hero’: The Construction of Josep Moragues as a Symbol of 
Independence for Catalonia” National Identities 13, no. 1 (2011): 57.  
242 Carr, Spain: 1808–1975, 545. 
243 Storm, “The Problems of the Spanish Nation-Building,” 147. 
 55
school or road, as Storm explains, depended upon the relationship between local 
politicians and their personal networks.244  
The state also faced difficulty in building national infrastructure. Constructing 
railroads in Spain was twice as expensive as in other “great iron centres,” as Carr notes, 
and the Spanish state may have been reluctant to integrate regions which it thought could 
pose a threat, leaving many regions isolated.245 
D. THE RISE OF CATALANISM AND THE TURN TOWARD SECESSION 
The Spanish American War—The Disaster—provided an opportunity for 
Catalanists to achieve political autonomy. Politicians in Madrid who for so long had 
attempted to build a centralized state realized they had fallen short of their nation-
building efforts. Spanish politicians could no longer ignore the rising current of Catalan 
regionalism, which was demanding autonomy from Madrid. This section explores the 
origins of Catalanism from the end of the Spanish American War to the start of the 
Spanish Civil War (1898–1936) and continues with an analysis that attempts to unravel 
why Catalanism, which had previously only demanded autonomy, now calls for 
independence. 
1. 1898–1936: The Rise of Catalanism 
Catalan nationalism began to mobilize the masses towards political aims towards 
the end of the 19th century. An increased interest in Catalonia’s cultural particularism 
arose in the 1840s, but this movement consisted of a small number of Catalan 
academics.246 This early literary movement also had no associated political programs that 
advocated a destiny separate from Spain. This movement had no intent being 
incompatible with Spanish nationalism, even when it looked back centuries before to an 
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era when Catalonia possessed its own political institutions.247 It would not be until the 
1880s, with Catalan nationalists such as Valentín Almirall, that a sense of Catalan 
identity, separate from Spain would begin to spread more broadly.248 Almirall helped 
instill an increasing awareness of Catalonian national identity and argued that Catalans 
were slaves of Castile being “governed in an alien tongue.”249  
The Spanish-American War and its implications, as Carr explains, “had its 
profoundest effects in Catalonia, where it turned Catalanism from a minority creed into 
the vehicle for generalized protest.”250 Thus, Catalan political movements began to seize 
on the growing disillusionment with the Spanish state to push their own regional agendas. 
The Lliga Regionalista, the combination of right-wing Catalonian candidates that formed 
a political party, capitalized on this sentiment. The Lliga’s policies marked a departure 
from potential cooperation with the central government, as hoped for by many in the 
early 19th century, to a more radical position by the early 20th century.251 The Lliga 
Regionalista exploited growing Catalonian consciousness and the perceived failure of 
Madrid to address Catalan concerns to further its political objectives. Founded in 1901, 
the party claimed that “there can be no political peace in Spain…until our problem is 
settled; which is to say, until Catalonia’s claim to self-government is satisfied.”252  
The inability for Catalan regionalists to consolidate on either side of the political 
spectrum mitigated their ability to influence the Spanish government. In first decade of 
the 20th century, the division between “realists” who would make deal with Spanish state 
and the “all or nothing” nationalists limited the political success of their political 
objectives.253 Prime Minister Maura understood the need to work with Catalonia, but 
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internal divisions within Catalanism precluded acceptance of an immediate solution. By 
1914, however, the Lliga Regionalista, a political coalition of conservative forces, had 
achieved the establishment of the Catalan Mancomunidad, a measure of limited local 
government for Catalan provinces.254 Yet the victory of the Lliga was seen by the left-
wing Catalan nationalists as a scheme between the conservative forces in Catalonia and 
those in the Spanish government. Left-leaning Catalan nationalists dismissed the 
Mancomunidad as a tool to institutionalize the “permanent denial of the rights of 
Catalonia.”255  
Primo de Rivera, a military dictator who ruled from 1923 until 1930, revoked the 
Mancomunidad in 1925.256 The Lliga, which had supported Primo de Rivera, found itself 
subject to his harsh repression. Primo de Rivera’s repression of Catalan culture only 
further mobilized Catalan nationalism.257 Additionally, Castilian intellectuals became 
increasingly critical of his policies and agreed that Catalonia’s cultural and linguistic 
identity should be protected.258 After Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship ended and was 
replaced by the Second Spanish Republic in 1931, Catalonia regained both political and 
cultural autonomy.259 Yet for an increasingly vocal number of Catalanists, this autonomy 
was insufficient; only a Catalan state as a republic within a Spanish federation would be 
adequate to protect Catalonia.  
2. The Turn toward Secession: 1978 to the Present 
The end of Franco’s regime led to a new constitution that permitted a degree of 
devolution while at the same time maintaining national unity. This ambiguity, which does 
not clearly define a federal or unitary state, has led autonomous communities such as 
Catalonia, who had lost autonomy during Franco’s reign, to resume their pursuit for 
autonomy. Rather than providing equal autonomy to all Spanish regions, the constitution 
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provides different paths to achieve autonomy, often resulting in statutes of autonomy 
with differing degrees of devolution, which in turn has caused some contempt between 
the autonomous communities.  
Support for Catalan independence has grown from 14 percent in 2005 to nearly  
50 percent in 2013.260 In about same time period, the percentage of Catalans who 
consider themselves as only Catalan (and not Spanish) has grown from 14 percent to 
22 percent.261 This change can be attributed to four main reasons. First, the Spanish 
government failed to negotiate with Catalonia about increasing its autonomy in the early 
2000s, beginning with the Partido Popular (PP), Spain’s national center-right party.262 
The PP viewed Catalan demands for greater autonomy with contempt and Catalonian 
politicians again felt mistreated by the central government. The leader of the center left 
party, the PSOE, despite claims to address Catalonia’s political demands, also failed to 
address or implement Catalan political demands.  
Second, Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy, which passed the Catalan 
parliament and later the Spanish parliament, was largely struck down by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court in 2010, after legal challenges were raised from both the PSOE and 
the PP, as well as from other regions.263 In the four years it took the court to decide on 
the case, the Catalan government endorsed a series of provocative measures, such as the 
holding of non-binding referendums on secession.264 The court struck down many 
provisions of the statute, including one that sought to recognize Catalonia officially as a 
nation, which led to strong nationalist demonstrations in Catalonia that benefited from the 
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mobilizing and organizational power of Catalan regional associations.265 Even if the 
court’s decisions were framed in the context of the Spanish constitution, the history of the 
relationship between the state and Catalonia framed the context for interpreting how to 
react to the court’s decision.  
Third, the growing economic downturn led Catalans to increasingly resent the 
fiscal arrangement they have, in which Catalonia contributes more to the central 
government than it receives.266 Some Catalans also point out that Catalonia should have 
stronger fiscal powers, similar to those held by the Basque Provinces.267 Catalan 
nationalists exploited these factors and combined them with historical grievances, real or 
imagined, to broaden the appeal of sovereignty-seeking Catalanism. Thus, for the last 
several years, millions of Catalans have demonstrated in support of independence on 
Catalonia’s national day, 11 September, a day which recalls the abolition of Catalonia’s 
autonomy and institutions in the War of Spanish Succession. 
Finally, the Catalan media has largely sided with the momentum of the 
independence campaign and other voices have largely been silenced or 
misrepresented.268 For example, in a survey conducted on 9 September 2013, 50 percent 
of Catalans believed in a federal solution for Catalonia. However, as Manuel Cruz 
implies, the media discounted these numbers and associated them to the Spanish 
conservative party, the PP.269 Catalan media outlets failed to portray that there is a large 
minority of Catalans who do not support the PP and remain only in favor of increased 
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autonomy and not independence.270 Catalan nationalists, aided by the media, can build on 
real or imagined historical grievances to send ominous messages to suggest that their 
language is in danger or that Catalonia itself could disappear.271 Though there is a 
significant minority of Catalans who favor increased autonomy over independence, as 
surveys attest, they are likely afraid to speak out so as to avoid being stigmatized.  
E. CONCLUSION 
As José Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish liberal philosopher noted, just as Spain was 
built by Castile, Spain was also dismantled by Castile.272 Initially the force behind a 
union that surpassed regional particularisms for the greater good of imperial Spain, 
Castile became jealous and threatened by them, abandoning them and failing to 
understand their developments.273 National institutions, such as the Catholic Church and 
the Monarchy, no longer acted as unitary forces but as self-absorbed establishments, 
acting in the name of national unity.274 In their place, no national symbols or programs 
arose to unite the Spanish people.  
As Spain’s overseas empire began peeling away, Castile looked inward and feared 
Spain’s internal dissolution. However, Castilian nation-builders were delayed in 
recognizing the need to develop a form of cultural or civic unity. The more they delayed, 
the harder national problems became to solve, leading Castile to strengthen its resolve in 
stamping out what it viewed as threats to national unity, namely Catalonia. Yet Castile’s 
attempts at centralizing Spain to prevent its further dissolution only weakened it by 
watering the seeds of Catalan nationalism. The heavy burden of Spain’s history frames 
the mindsets of many Catalans and has made honest negotiation with the state 
challenging. At the same time, political leaders in Madrid often view increasing Catalan 
autonomy as a threat and sometimes fail to make pragmatic decisions or gestures that 
could build trust and establish a dialogue from which to address one another’s demands. 
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IV. DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION STRENGTHEN OR 
WEAKEN REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS? 
Spain and Germany are among a small minority of countries within the European 
Union that possess legislative and policy-making powers at the sub-national, or regional, 
level. While the European Union (EU) has increased the formal influence of regions in 
non-institutional bodies, such as the Committee of the Regions, the extent to which 
regions have increased their political influence within EU institutions has been 
conditioned by national governments, as the latter remain the most important political 
actors within the EU.275 In Spain, the antagonistic relationship among the autonomous 
communities (ACs), as well as between the ACs and the state, has limited AC influence 
at the EU level. In contrast, the cooperative form of federalism both across the German 
Länder, and between the Länder and the central government in Germany, has allowed 
regional governments and the German central government to maintain their political 
influence. This chapter argues that while regional governments have become increasingly 
active in the European Union, their influence has been dependent on the nature of their 
relationship with their central government. This relationship is also fundamentally 
contingent on the intergovernmental institutional framework existing in the member-
country.  
Consensus exists among European Union scholars that the nature of the state, and 
by extension sub-state power, has been changing; how it has been changing remains 
contested.276 Two main theories provide divergent insights. The first, as explained by 
Andrea Noferini et al., argues that the recentralization of policy to the EU level gives the 
central government more power over regional governments. Because regions do not have 
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the same influence as the nation states in the EU, central governments can “re-
appropriate” any devolved competencies from their regional governments.277 Conversely, 
the other main theory suggests that the EU’s promotion of subsidiarity and the new 
opportunities for regions in the EU has given them new influence, such as the ability to 
open offices in Brussels to promote their particular interests and the ability to conduct a 
form of foreign relations.278 Furthermore, European scholars such as Simona Piattoni 
explain that regions, in some cases, have been able to bypass national governments as 
they acquire new influence.279 While both of these arguments provide critical insight into 
how the EU empowers (or disempowers) regional governments,280 understanding the 
institutional framework in the relevant member-country helps reveal which theory is most 
compatible.  
This chapter begins by addressing how the European Union has allowed regions 
to increase their voice in EU decision-making. It then examines the institutional 
framework that has shaped regional power in Spain, giving particular focus to Catalonia. 
By extension of this framework, the chapter contends that though ACs have increased 
their representation at the EU level, their influence has only increased as allowed by the 
Spanish government. The second half of the chapter introduces the notion of cooperative 
federalism in Germany and how this concept has enabled regions to maintain their 
influence at the national, and by extension, supranational levels of government.  
A. SPANISH INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK BETWEEN REGIONS AND 
THE CENTER 
The Spanish Constitution affected the nature of regions in three ways: the nature 
by which regions inherit and keep power, the relationship between regions (horizontal 
relationship), and the relationship between the center and the region (vertical 
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relationship). The first significant milestone in the history of modern Spanish regions, the 
Spanish constitution of 1978, foresaw the potential devolution of some powers to 
autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas). However, two main problems arose 
due to the nature of the constitution. First, while the constitution did specify twenty-two 
relatively undisputed powers over which ACs could have jurisdiction, it left room for the 
ACs to amend their statutes of autonomy—after a waiting period of five years—to 
potentially gain more significant powers.281 While this agreement is understandable 
given the fragile transitional period, which had its number of difficulties including an 
attempted coup, the failure to delineate the full possibility of new competencies of the 
ACs left resolution to a future date. This quandary left Spanish regions to their own 
devices to see how much power they could wrest from the central government.282 The 
Spanish Constitutional Court, which derived its power from and became largely 
influenced by the central government, was left to arbitrate disputes between the two 
polities.283 Meanwhile, the constitution explicitly prohibited any sort of federation of 
autonomous communities.284 Thus, the line of demarcation of what powers could be 
exercised by ACs would be fought between Madrid and the ACs, and between the ACs 
themselves. 
The second constitutional problem was the fact that Article Two distinguished 
between the self-government of regions and nationalities. This nuanced yet important 
distinction had significant implications. Historical nations, such as Catalans, would be 
able to receive “fast track” processing for autonomy, while non-historical regions, such as 
Andalucía, would be on the “slow track” for autonomy.285 This differentiated status 
created division not only between the three historical nations (Catalonia, the Basque 
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Country, and Galicia) and the remaining regions but between the historical nations 
themselves. For example, the Basque country has received more fiscal and legislative 
powers than the other historical communities due to the constitutional provision and its 
unique statute of autonomy.286 Catalonia’s aspirations have instigated other ACs to 
demand similar privileges. This has led to what Tanja Börzel calls, “cada uno por su 
cuenta,” or “every man for himself,” which implies that each AC is to fend for itself.287  
When Madrid created what are known as sectorial conferences to coordinate 
relations between the central government and the ACs, Catalonia and the Basque country 
appealed to the Spanish Constitutional Court as they argued that this would remove “all 
autonomy from the new ACs.”288 While these conferences were declared constitutional 
as a forum for discussion, they were viewed by many ACs as way for the central 
government to control the ACs, rather than to foster genuine relations.289 While the 
Spanish Senate does have some members (58 of 266) from the AC assemblies,290 they 
operate along political, not territorial lines; the effectiveness of senate reforms aimed at 
promoting AC prominence in both EU and state affairs has been viewed by scholars as an 
important first step but largely inadequate.291 Bilateral commissions, which Madrid 
established to manage technical aspects of devolution, have served to “pacify” ACs rather 
than to seek to alter the “institutional landscape.”292  
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Article 145 of the Spanish Constitution prohibits formal horizontal agreements 
between ACs unless they are approved by the Spanish legislature. Even if the legislature 
was willing to approve any formal cooperation between the ACs, it would be difficult for 
the ACs to reach a strong consensus given the wide variance in Statutes of Autonomy 
between them. The Basque country’s privileged status, for instance, makes it less 
dependent and willing to seek to establish informal or formal horizontal cooperation.293 
Likewise, it is less reliant on vertical integration, or cooperation with the central 
government, as it possesses the capacity to implement many of its own policies 
independent of Madrid’s control. Failure to establish horizontal links across regions 
limited the degree to which Spanish regions could balance their power with Madrid and 
curtailed their influence in the EU.  
In the period between 1978 and 2005, ACs concluded a total of only 20 horizontal 
agreements.294 Though such scholars as María Jesús García Morales argue that there has 
been a recent increase in horizontal agreements.295 The Catalan regional government’s 
attempt to reform its statute of autonomy, in which it declares Catalan as the language of 
“preferential use in Public Administration” and highlights Catalonia’s uniqueness as a 
nation in an attempt to derive additional powers, has increased tensions between 
Catalonia and other ACs and between Catalonia and the central government.296 
Furthermore, the Spanish Constitutional Court’s refusal to recognize Catalonia as a 
nation and the rejection of Catalan as a preferential language in official government 
forums has sparked a radical backlash by Catalan nationalist parties and has moved 
center parties to adopt a more nationalist position as evident by the recent push from 
Catalan political parties on holding an independence referendum.297  
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B. HOW EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS AFFECTED REGIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN SPAIN 
European integration allowed the central government to prevent a further 
devolution of powers to the regions. Because EU policy was initially considered foreign 
relations, the Spanish state held the sole right to negotiate and implement EU policy.298 
In order to prevent their perceived loss of power due to European integration, ACs such 
as Catalonia attempted to circumvent Spain’s central government and establish direct ties 
with the EU.299 Catalonia was among the first ACs to establish representation in Brussels 
in 1986, even though its presence would not be legitimized by Spanish regulation until 
1994.300 Furthermore, Catalonia resorted to a strategy of “constitutional conflict” to 
prevent the state from seizing what it perceived to be its prerogatives.301 However, ACs 
like Catalonia that attempted state-bypassing were mostly unsuccessful.302 Even after the 
Spanish Constitutional Court declared that EU matters were not strictly under the domain 
of foreign relations and that ACs could certain specified policies, ACs did not have the 
capacity to challenge the authority of the central government in dictating how to 
implement EU policy.303  
Recent court decisions have suggested that Spain may allow for increased AC 
influence in the EU. In 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled that direct bilateral 
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(Autonomous Community to European Union) participation could be authorized when it 
solely affects the “Autonomous Community in question and not the others.”304 However, 
even if there is an issue where the matter would solely affect one AC, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court has made clear that “in no event is the central government bound by 
the opinion of the Autonomous Community.”305 In contrast, as will be explained later, 
German Länder have the ability to compel the central government to adopt their opinion. 
Two of the most important EU institutions and bodies where ACs have potential 
for indirect and direct influence, respectively, are the Council of Ministers (CoM) and the 
Committee of Regions (CoR). Since Maastricht, ACs have had the ability to nominate a 
representative to the Spanish delegation, which if approved by the appropriate sectorial 
conference, has the possibility to participate in four of the ten Council Configurations.306 
While AC representation in council configurations is an important symbolic step, their 
influence at this stage is limited as they can only speak if the subject matter being 
discussed falls within the domain of the ACs, if there is consensus among the ACs and if 
permitted by the head of the Spanish delegation.307 Though AC representatives also take 
place in working groups and preparatory sessions for the councils, the lack of any 
horizontal institutions to coordinate and negotiate AC positions limits their influence.  
Autonomous Communities have direct representation in the Committee of 
Regions; Artur Mas, the president of Catalonia’s regional government, was one of its 
members.308 The Lisbon Treaty increased the influence of the CoR, as noted by two 
important powers. First, while the CoR has no right to veto legislation, the three main EU 
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institutions must consult the CoR when making a law with a regional impact.309 Second, 
the CoR has the right to appeal EU legislation to the Court of Justice if the legislation 
violates the principle of subsidiarity.310 However, the CoR is not an EU institution, and 
despite the increased role given to regions after the Lisbon Treaty, the CoR still lacks 
institutional power or sufficient institutional integration to decisively shape legislation. 
Additionally, because the CoR does not take a position on how member-states are divided 
internally, countries with a prevalence of devolved powers (such as Spain and Germany) 
are mixed with those that have predominantly administrative regions under central 
government control, potentially thwarting regional government influence.311  
C. GERMAN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE CENTER 
AND REGIONS 
While both Germany and Spain have high degrees of decentralization, Germany’s 
constitutional framework sets it apart. The necessity of both horizontal and vertical 
relationships between the Länder and the federal government fosters a sort of 
“cooperative federalism” that maintains a balance of power between the Länder and the 
federal government.312 Vertically, the Länder differ from the Spanish ACs in two ways. 
First, whereas ACs have fought Madrid for devolved powers embodied in the various 
statutes of autonomy,313 German Länder have their own devolved powers enshrined in 
their regional constitutions.314 The German Federal government possesses those 
authorities that the Länder have provided it via the German Basic Law, Germany’s 
                                                 
309 European Union, Committee of Regions, A New Treaty : a New Role for Regions and Local 
Authorities, accessed 13 February, 2015, 
http://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/brochures/Documents/84fa6e84–0373–42a2-a801-
c8ea83a24a72.pdf. 
310 European Union, Committee of Regions, A New Treaty, 2. 
311 Noferini, Beltran, and Nouvilas, “Does the EU empower (or disempower) the position of regional 
governments?,” 24. 
312 Rainer Arnold, “The Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems: The Model of Germany,” in 
The Ways of Federalism in Western Countries and the Horizons of Territorial Autonomy in Spain 2 (Berlin: 
Springer, 2013), 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978–3–642–27717–7. 
313 Some ACs, such as Catalonia, have a constitutional provision in addition to a statute of autonomy. 
314 Arnold, “The Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems,” 40. 
 69
constitution.315 Second, whereas Spanish ACs have no de-facto vertical territorial 
institution to represent themselves vis-à-vis the central government, German regions have 
significant power in the Bundesrat, one of Germany’s two legislative bodies, the other 
being the Bundestag. Especially after the Lisbon Treaty, which emphasized the principle 
of subsidiarity in order to counter euroskepticism (and possibly to offset the EU’s 
recognized democratic deficit), the Bundesrat has served as a strong conduit for regional 
government representation in the EU.316  
Horizontal cooperation in the Länder is markedly different. Unlike the Spanish 
constitution that restricts horizontal cooperation, German Länder frequently pass inter-
Länder treaties. Additionally, the German Basic Law, unlike the Spanish constitution, 
identifies all of Germany’s Länder without conferring any special status among them.317 
While historical Länder, such as Bavaria, maintain their unique constitutions, the equal 
treatment of Länder in the Basic Law has enabled more horizontal cooperation. Because 
the rights and the recognition of the self-governing Länder were already recognized from 
the outset of Germany’s Basic Law in 1949,318 the need for Länder to compete 
horizontally and vertically was mitigated. Whereas Spanish autonomous communities 
have been characterized as “every community for itself,” which has impeded the 
rebalancing of power in the face of European integration, Börzel characterizes German 
Länder’s horizontal relationships as “Gemeinsam sind wir stark,” or “together we are 
strong.”319 While regions fought European integration in order to maintain their historical 
rights, the Länder’s cooperative federalism better enabled them to preserve their regional 
influence as they more successfully interacted both horizontally and vertically.  
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D. HOW EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS AFFECTED REGIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN GERMANY 
Whereas Spanish regulation has only recently considered the representation of 
regions within the framework of European integration, German agreements, from as early 
as 1957, have established the understanding that the German Federation is acting on the 
behalf of the Länder “when negotiating or signing foreign treaties.”320 Due to the 
institutional strength of German Länder, as evident both with their horizontal linkages 
and their weighty vertical influence via the Bundesrat, they have maintained their 
regional powers or increased their influence at in the EU. When the Christian Social 
Union (CSU), the most significant party in Bavaria in the last several decades, felt that 
the EU was encroaching on Länder rights, it organized with other German states and 
amended the constitution to protect regional interests.321 The amended article 23 of the 
BL states that the “Länder shall participate in matters concerning the European Union” 
via the Bundestag and Bundesrat.322 Furthermore, it asserts that the Federal Government 
“shall keep the Bundestag and the Bundesrat informed, comprehensively and at the 
earliest possible time.”323 As early as 1992, German Länder ministers created a 
committee to coordinate Länder strategy in response to EU integration; their focus on the 
principle of subsidiarity is manifested in EU law today.324 The CSU conditioned its 
support on EU integration with the preservation of regional autonomy.325 Thus, German 
Länder responded to EU integration by collectively asserting and reinforcing their role in 
the Bundesrat, a body where unlike in Spain, the German regions maintain joint decision-
making authority. 
There are several important differences between Germany and Spain with regard 
to their influence in the EU. While Spain introduced a General Commission of ACs in 
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attempt to make up for the lack of territorial representation in central government 
decision-making, this commission maintains “neither the composition nor the functions 
required” to empower the ACs and remains “listless and weak.”326 Furthermore, a second 
Spanish commission that was supposed to inform ACs and the Spanish Senate regarding 
EU legislative proposals has been “limited by a dependence on the government’s 
willingness to supply meaningful information” and its “influence on government policy” 
has been minimal.327 By contrast, the Bundesrat possesses both a Committee on 
European Union Affairs and a Chamber for European Affairs,328 which have gained 
significant legislative standing particularly after Germany’s ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty, allowing for greater regional involvement in EU affairs.329 Germany, unlike 
Spain, has reformed its constitution in response to EU integration and has anchored 
regional government representation into its institutional culture of cooperative federalism.  
While some scholars argue that regional parliaments in Germany have lost some 
influence vis-à-vis the European Union, regional representation in the executive form, 
such as the Bundesrat, has persisted and decisively impacts EU policy, particularly when 
it relates to regional competences.330 For example, when the EU CoM is discussing 
matters such as culture and education, a Land minister will be sent to represent 
Germany’s Länder but the minister is not required to mirror the position of the Federal 
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government.331 If the matter being discussed is an administrative one that affects the 
competencies of the Länder, Germany’s appropriate federal minister must “follow the 
position of the Federal Council” which is binding with a “two-thirds majority vote.”332  
E. CONCLUSION 
On the whole, European integration has affected regions differently. In Germany, 
the Länder have fought back in response to European integration. In Spain, some regional 
competencies, for which the regions had fought, are now mediated largely via the central 
government with little regional input. The degree to which regions in Spain and Germany 
have become empowered or not has been shaped by the institutional differences anchored 
in their respective constitutional frameworks and how these constitutions have adapted or 
failed to adapt to meet the challenge of European integration. German Länder, which 
have had a more cooperative relationship between themselves and with the central 
government have been able to maintain their voice in the EU. In contrast, Spanish regions 
have faced difficulty inheriting or keeping devolved powers in light of the centralizing 
pressures of the European Union.  
Though the EU does allow for some direct regional representation in the CoR and 
in some aspects of the CoM, the CoR has limited influence in the EU and the influence in 
the CoM is dependent on the prerogatives of the central government. Though Spain 
operates similar to the federalist system in Germany, it lacks the associated constitutional 
framework and territorial setup that Germany has which has allowed regions to balance 
centralizing tendencies. Improving horizontal cooperation across Spanish ACs may 
improve their collective ability to exert vertical influence at the state and EU level, but it 
will be a difficult task transitioning from a culture of competitive regionalism to a 
concept of cooperative federalism. Because the nation state is still the dominant player in 
the European Union, the degree to which regions are empowered or disempowered is 
associated to the relationship between regions and their central government. For regions 
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to acquire more influence in the EU, they should not look to the EU, but to their fellow 




















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 75
V. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF SECESSION 
At the end of the Cold War, regional movements, often based on ethno-linguistic 
or cultural grounds, transformed into sovereignty-seeking forces, resulting in the 
establishment of several new states, mostly in Eastern Europe.333 Many of these states, 
such as the Baltic States, subsequently joined the European Union and NATO. Yet none 
of these new states emerged as successor states from either the European Union (EU) or 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. Recently, subnational, 
sovereignty-seeking movements have arisen in NATO and EU member-states such as 
Spain. These movements present the EU and NATO new challenges. Catalonia held an 
unofficial referendum on 9 November 2014 and plans to use parliamentary elections in 
September 2015 as a de facto poll on independence.334 An independent Catalonia would 
present an unprecedented situation for the European Union and NATO. Never before has 
an EU or NATO country split with both parts seeking continued membership.335 While 
Catalonia’s November 2014 consultation was non-binding, the ramifications of any 
subsequent successful referenda would have repercussions not only in Spain but also 
across Europe and other international institutions.   
While the Spanish Supreme Court rejects any official or unofficial Catalan 
referendum, Catalonia’s independence movement persists. The potential security 
consequences of separatist movements within NATO and EU countries have received 
relatively little analysis, with discussions often taking a back-seat to economic issues. 
Even fewer sources exist that explore the security implications of a non-consensual 
divorce within a NATO or EU country, as would be the case with Catalonia. What are the 
security implications of secession within NATO and EU countries, and has an official or 
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unofficial understanding regarding secession emerged within these organizations? This 
chapter analyzes the security implications of any Catalan secession and argues that 
Catalonia’s divorce from Spain is likely to result in short-term security reductions for 
both Barcelona and Madrid.336  
While the Spanish Supreme Court declared Catalonia’s 2014 consultation illegal, 
the security issues will remain relevant if the underlying reasons for attempted divorce 
are not addressed. Catalan politicians vociferously denounced the Spanish state’s 
decision to deny the legal merit of the referendum and have raised the issue to the 
European Union.337 Despite Spain’s Constitutional Court decision on February 24, 2015 
which concluded that Catalonia’s government does not have the authority to hold any 
future referendum on independence, Catalonia’s president has vowed to continue fighting 
for the right to decide.338 
This chapter analyzes the security implications through the lens of five security 
dilemmas. First, it acknowledges that balanced rhetoric and documentation regarding 
Catalonia’s potential secession is absent, pushing debate to the margins, making balanced 
estimates on future defense scenarios difficult. Second, it contends that the potential 
relationships between this would-be independent state and international security 
organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European 
Union (EU) are more problematic than independence leaders suggest. Third, it argues that 
secession will severely limit the capability of the armed forces for the dyad in Spain. 
Fourth, it argues that Catalonia is internally divided on the nature of any future defense 
capabilities. Fifth, it explains that the EU’s continued silence on secession has been more 
problematic than it had hoped for. Rather than strictly remaining neutral, EU politicians 
have made varying statements that have been extrapolated and interpreted by both pro- 
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and anti-secession advocates as official policy to further their own agendas. To mitigate 
security vulnerabilities for all polities, central governments and the EU should 
acknowledge the presence of strong independence movements and try to manage them in 
a pragmatic manner. 
A. THE DIFFICULTIES OF ASSESSING THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
OF AN INDEPENDENT CATALONIA 
The Spanish government regarded the Catalonia referendum as unconstitutional 
and illegal. Given that official debate or negotiation in Spain is absent, unofficial rhetoric 
often becomes more extreme and crowds out more moderate voices. This lack of 
pragmatic debate on devolution or proposals to reform the constitution—at least from the 
Partido Popular, which currently holds majorities in both legislative chambers—pushes 
the debate to the margins, preventing a balanced assessment of the potential security 
implications of Catalan secession. 
Spain’s refusal to recognize the legality of Catalonia’s independence movement 
provides little insight into Madrid’s future relations with a newly independent Catalonia. 
Under Article Eight of the Spanish constitution, the Armed Forces have a mission to 
defend Spain’s territorial integrity and constitutional order.339 While Miquel Sellarès, 
director of the Center for Strategic Studies of Catalonia, maintains that the Spanish army 
would “not dare” to deploy the army to intervene in Catalonia, statements made by 
Spanish government officials do not seem to rule out this option.340 Spain’s foreign 
minister José Manuel García Margallo states that Madrid has the right to use the “full 
force of the law” to ensure that no referendum will be held and reiterates Spain’s 
constitutional right to suspend Catalonia’s regional government.341  
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However, Madrid refrained from deploying military forces to Catalonia, opting 
instead for the legal suspension of Catalonia’s referendum. Nonetheless, Spain could 
theoretically deploy its military to uphold Article 155 of the Spanish constitution, which 
states that the Spanish national government, if unable to reach a satisfactory resolution 
with the autonomous community, maintains the right to forcefully compel that 
community to comply with Spanish national interests.342 Yet, even if Madrid opted to 
deploy its military police or military to prevent Catalan secession, it is questionable 
whether it would be a “massacre” as Sellarès claims.343 Until now, Spanish politicians 
have mostly refrained from making overt military threats to Catalonia, preferring to 
pursue legal or political options. The conservative party, the PP, has called for the 
president of Catalonia’s regional government, Artur Mas, to resign.344 The Spanish 
Constitutional Court declared the 9 November 2014 consultation unconstitutional and has 
also deemed any future Catalonian referenda illegal.345 The situation will become 
increasingly problematic and make security analysis even more challenging with no 
certainty regarding the circumstances of any potential divorce.  
Scant professional literature exists regarding the security implications of 
secession. The only Catalan regional government source that discusses security and 
defense matters regarding independence is a document published in Catalan on 28 July 
2014, which remains vague on specific defense plans.346 This document seems to 
indicate that Article 42 of the treaty of the European Union, which provides for a 
common security and defense policy, is a sufficient security guarantee for an independent 
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Catalonia.347 The Catalan government has released several white papers regarding 
possible transitions into a newly independent state while Madrid, understandably, has not 
published any analysis on a sovereign Catalonia.348 While the most recent Spanish 
National Security Strategy identifies Gibraltar as a source of friction between Spain and 
the United Kingdom, the potential secession of Catalonia is not explicitly mentioned.349 
Likewise, the Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (Spanish Strategic Studies 
Institute or IEEE) has not published any reports that directly address the security 
implications of a potential Catalonian secession. Thus, specific information on the 
security implications of Catalonian secession is limited to non-governmental spheres such 
as political groups, think tanks, and civil society.  
The Assemblea Nacional Catalana (Catalan National Assembly or ANC), a 
political organization advocating independence, has published a defense analysis of an 
independent Catalonia, but it hardly touches on any specific defense or security issues.350 
The Catalan Security Studies Institute has published documents regarding security 
aspects of independence, but it remains unclear as to who authored these documents and 
whether consensus exists within Catalonia for its proposals. The state of the Catalonian 
armed forces is hard to judge as literature regarding the required or probable defense 
capabilities of an independent Catalonia is scant.  
Civil debate in Catalonia seems dominated by Catalan nationalists. Catalan 
nationalist groups sometimes denigrate civil organizations that oppose independence.  
For example, the Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (Initiative for Catalonia Greens or ICV) 
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accused the Societat Civil Catalana, a group that is against secession, of having links to 
fascism.351 Catalan nationalists can silence voices that oppose independence by 
incorrectly depicting support for Spanish unity as support for Spain’s suppression of 
Catalan autonomy. Help Catalonia, a nationalist Catalan think tank on defense, has a bold 
mission statement on its website that states, “Denouncing the silent war Spain is waging 
against Catalonia.”352 The website also features articles in which the authors claim that 
Spanish politicians have equated Catalonia’s independence movement with Nazism.353 
Alex Calvo and Pol Molas, two Catalan security analysts, characterize Spain as a rogue 
state, asserting that Spain is “Europe’s North Korea.”354 Sellarès, the head of the Center 
for Strategic Studies of Catalonia, argues that the Spanish government is deliberately 
infiltrating Catalonian police forces to foment trouble within the region.355 Thus, the 
loudest voices that Madrid hears from Barcelona are the nationalist ones. This likely 
leads Madrid to react in a less conciliatory manner. The nature of the relationship 
between Madrid and Catalonia leads to exaggerated and one-sided assessments and the 
impasse provides an opportunity for inflaming Catalonia’s wounded nationalist 
rhetoric.356  
Nationalist rhetoric has also shown that the debate over the distribution of military 
assets and liabilities could be problematic. A group of Catalonian lawyers working for the 
Catalan National Congress published a report rejecting payment for any burden of 
Spanish debt, arguing that Madrid has long plundered Catalonia financially, receiving 
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nothing in return.357 To make things more contested, these lawyers argue that Catalonia 
should still receive 16 percent—a number corresponding to Catalonia’s percentage of 
Spain’s population—of state property, including military assets.358 A more recent 
publication by Catalonia’s regional government discusses several scenarios but seems to 
reference other situations that may not be the right precedent. For example, the document 
references the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a model for the distribution of assets and 
liabilities, a problematic comparison at best.359 
B. CATALONIA’S PROBLEMATIC ENTRY INTO NATO AND THE EU 
Catalonia has appealed to numerous international organizations in order to 
increase international support for its independence campaign. More than 200 Catalan 
politicians working in municipal, regional, national, and EU governments have signed a 
petition requesting support from the EU, the UN, and the OSCE.360 Yet Catalan efforts 
have not been successful in guaranteeing commitments of support from any significant 
number of European leaders. The Latvian minister, who had initially offered tentative 
support to Catalonia’s bid for independence, reneged on his hypothetical support after 
being summoned by Spain’s foreign minister to explain his position.361 Given that 
Madrid and Catalonia have been unable to reach any consensus, Catalonia might resort to 
a unilateral declaration of independence. 
However, any unilateral declaration of independence will almost certainly leave 
Catalonia outside the collective security guarantees of NATO and the European Union. 
Thus, the few existing Catalan sources on security, which claim that Catalonia’s security 
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would be guaranteed by either of these organizations, make problematic assumptions. 
The ANC argues that because Spain is part of the EU, Catalonia would remain a member 
of the EU and be integrated into the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) 
with some assistance from the European Defense Agency.362 Likewise, this political 
group argues that Catalonia, in accordance with prevailing legal doctrine, would 
automatically retain NATO membership since Spain is a NATO country.363 Some 
Catalan security analysts, including Calvo and Molas, have argued that NATO needs 
Catalonia as much as Catalonia needs it, insisting that the region would be a vital pillar of 
NATO.364 Similarly, Miquel Sellarès argues that because of Catalonia’s geostrategic 
importance, it will be hard for NATO to exclude an independent Catalonia.365 These 
assumptions are problematic at best.   
Statements from Sellarès seem to discount numerous assertions, from the 
president of the EU Council to the NATO secretary general, which have unequivocally 
stated that Catalonia would be excluded (at least initially) from the European Union and 
NATO, respectively.366 While the EU has the potential to “conclude international 
agreements” with states that are not universally recognized, any such association 
agreement with Catalonia is not likely to be an assurance of future membership.367 
Although the EU’s recent association agreement with Ukraine, arguably a country with 
greater strategic importance, may deepen political and economic ties, any official 
                                                 




364 Alex Calvo and Pol Molas, “Catalunya, un Pilar Imprescindible de l'OTAN,” 4 January 2014, 
http://www.vilaweb.cat/opinio_contundent/4165225/catalunya-pilar-imprescindible-lotan.html 
365 Miquel Sellarès, “Security and Defense” Interview. See minute 10:58, 
http://ambindependencia.cat/en/seguretat-i-defensa-2/. 
366 BBC News, “Scottish or Catalan Vote 'Torpedoes EU', says Spain's Rajoy,” 17 September 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29234242; “An Independent Scotland Would also Mean an Exit 
from EU, NATO,” NY Daily News, September 15, 2014, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/independent-scotland-exit-eu-nato-article-1.1940110. 
367 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on a Feasibility Study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European 
Union and Kosovo,” Brussels, October 10, 2014,  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/ks_feasibility_2012_en.pdf. 
 83
membership prospects are likely to take decades, given Ukraine’s unresolved territorial 
disputes. Kosovo’s failure to join either NATO or the EU—despite some efforts at more 
extensive cooperation—also demonstrates that Catalonia’s potential non-consensual 
divorce would be problematic regarding EU or NATO membership aspirations.  
Nonetheless, some Catalan parties have not discounted Kosovo’s precedent as an 
option for Catalonia. Catalonia’s nationalist and pro-independence leftist party, the 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Repbulican Left of Catalonia or ERC), has argued 
that if Spain does not accommodate Catalonia’s desire to decide its future, it can follow 
Kosovo’s model, known as the “via Kosovar.”368 Another party, the democratic 
convergence party of Catalonia (CDC), which makes up the majority of the CiU electoral 
alliance, claimed on 7 March 2015 that Catalonia will be a free nation within the year.369 
The European Union was—and remains—divided with regards to supporting Kosovo’s 
independence, and any “via Kosovar” option is likely to prove extremely problematic for 
Catalonia. While the EU and NATO have no explicit policy on internal secessionist 
movements in their member states,370 the more likely situation is that Catalonia’s 
accession into NATO and the EU will be more problematic than independence advocates 
suggest. 
C. CATALONIA: INTERNALLY DIVIDED ON DEFENSE 
Catalonian politicians have neither made defense or security issues a priority 
when discussing independence nor reached a consensus about defense. Among the 
Catalan public, there is even less awareness of security implications for an independent 
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Catalonia.371 Artur Mas, President of the Generalitat de Catalunya, suggests that the 
region will not need an Army since Catalonia will remain part of both the EU and NATO, 
organizations that share defense resources.372 On the other hand, the leftist independence-
seeking Catalan party, the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), is debating 
whether to establish an army of 35,000 regulars, a more specialized force which can 
contribute to collective security, or to establish security guarantees with countries such as 
France.373 However, a group of Catalan jurists maintains that any new Catalan republic 
would not require a military.374 The only Catalan government report that mentions 
security and defense remains vague on plans for a Catalan military, indicating the 
following potential options: militarizing the Catalan police forces, creating a national 
guard that takes on both civil and military functions, or creating an army.375 While 
leaving various options open can be a benefit, if Catalonia secedes from Spain without 
even having an agreed-upon defense plan, it will be in an extremely vulnerable position.  
D. THE DIFFICULT PROSPECTS OF BUILDING AN AUTONOMOUS 
DEFENSE CAPABILITY 
An independent Catalonia would face the task of developing an entirely new 
defense establishment, a situation which could increase its vulnerability. Catalonia would 
lose the inherent benefits associated with a common defense, such as cost savings 
associated with the economy of scale. If Catalonia refuses to pay a proportional share of 
its debt to Spain, Madrid would be unlikely to provide it moveable defense assets. An 
independent Catalonia would be challenged to make significant investments in defense, 
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especially if Catalonia is held to account for its share of Spain’s debt. Political support for 
Catalan defense spending might be similar to the general trend in Spain, which has seen a 
sharp decline. Even if Catalonia spends the NATO benchmark of two percent of gross 
domestic product on defense,376 as the Catalan defense think-tank Societat d'Estudis 
Militars suggests, this will likely be insufficient to establish a credible maritime deterrent, 
particularly if Barcelona receives no assets from Madrid. While Catalonia has two large 
ports in Barcelona and Tarragona, it possesses no naval bases. Assuming there is political 
will to build up naval bases in these ports—a problematic assumption given the current 
economic situation in Spain—there will still be several issues. If Catalonia inherits naval 
platforms from Spain, it will likely take years to establish support structures, such as 
skilled maintenance workers, support facilities, and training facilities to keep its ships 
deployable.  
To its credit, the Societat d'Estudis Militars (Society of Military Studies or SEM) 
recognizes though perhaps underestimates the enormous challenges Catalonia will face 
for any future independence. In a publication entitled “Dimensions of the Catalan 
Defence Forces I: Naval Forces,” the group recognizes that in the first several years, 
Catalonia will “have to improvise with the available resources and personnel.”377 The 
authors recognize that the Armed Forces of an independent Catalonia will be largely 
dependent on foreign advisors. Leading defense countries such as the United States 
acknowledge Catalonia’s distinctness but advocate resolving Catalan wishes in 
accordance with Spanish law.378 Countries that support Madrid’s position (or that do not 
recognize Catalonia’s right to secede) will likely hesitate to assist building Catalonia’s 
maritime capability if it unilaterally declares independence. Despite claims by Catalan 
defense analysts such as Alex Calvo, who argue that Britain and Japan would assist the 
development of Catalonia’s Navy, these hopes are extremely optimistic and seem to 
                                                 
376 Societat d'Estudis Militars, “Catalonia, Committed to Collective security,” September 4, 2014, 
http://sem-cat.blogspot.com/. 
377 Societat d'Estudis Militars, “Dimensions of the Catalan Defence Forces I: Naval Forces,” accessed 
on March 2, 2014, https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B8W0FX7ueB2lSEpVQkZ4RURtN2M/edit. 
378 Angela Bourne, “Europeanization and Secession: The Cases of Catalonia and Scotland,” Journal 
on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 13, no. 3 (2014): 103, 
http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2014/Bourne.pdf. 
 86
discount the fact that these countries do not officially support Catalonia’s bid for 
independence.379 Catalonia has also not had to administer its own security, given that all 
of its security needs have been managed by Madrid. Catalonia’s unilateral exit would 
leave few experts within Catalonia that have experience in building a defense 
establishment from the ground up or in managing one.  
An independent Catalonia would also have to create an independent intelligence 
capability, which could make it more vulnerable to threats in the short-term, particularly 
if Madrid does not share its intelligence. The group also recognizes that it might take 10–
15 years to project “force within a multinational framework.”380 While having a clean 
slate is potentially a benefit, as it could allow for specialization, during the transitional 
period Catalonia would remain vulnerable to security threats.  
Catalonia would not be the only actor with increased vulnerabilities. Madrid 
would also be significantly affected by the loss of Catalonia’s contributions to Spain’s 
defense establishment. Catalonia, which represents 16 percent of Spain’s population, 
accounts for about 19 percent of Spain’s gross domestic product.381 Spain’s defense 
spending has decreased by 38 percent from 2008 to 2015, with a current defense budget 
of only 5.7 billion Euros. Catalonia’s exit from Spain would likely mean that Spanish 
defense spending would suffer a 19 percent budget cut. Even without Catalonia’s 
departure, Spain’s current military capabilities are deficient. Spain’s defense ministry has 
pointed out that current levels of defense spending and investment in defense firms have 
been insufficient to achieve the modernization levels required for the Spanish Armed 
Forces to execute their assigned missions.382 Spanish defense firms are losing their 
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technological edge and are becoming increasingly vulnerable to being taken over by 
foreign companies.383 This demonstrates that increasing defense spending has been 
extremely difficult and that Catalonia’s prospective independence would not only 
degrade Catalonia’s security situation, but could also significantly impact the remainder 
of Spain’s military establishment.  
E. THE EU IS STILL DIVIDED ON SECESSION WITHIN EUROPE 
While Crimea’s referendum and Russia’s subsequent annexation have provided 
widespread consensus within the EU on what is not a legitimate form of secession, 
Catalonia’s independence movement illustrates that Europe is still divided.  The EU has 
largely refrained from taking an official policy on secession, a position that Neil Walker 
terms “conservative neutrality.”384 This policy, despite its apparent logic, is problematic 
for several reasons.  
First, the absence of official policy or guidelines can lead to different 
interpretations by EU officials. For example, commenting on Scotland’s hypothetical 
independence, former EU Commission President Barroso reiterated his predecessor’s 
opinion that “a new state created by secession from an existing member state would have 
to apply for membership following dedicated Art.49 route for all new candidates.”385 
Barroso’s replacement, Jean-Claude Juncker, stated that Scotland as an “internal 
applicant” would already meet “core-EU requirements” and thus constitute a special and 
separate case, distinct from applicant countries that fell outside EU borders.386 Thus, 
Juncker effectively contradicted two of his predecessors. These seemingly inconsistent 
statements have provided both pro and anti-independence advocates ammunition for their 
causes. Rather than having no effect on independence movements, contradictory 
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statements, which can be interpreted as official policy, have undermined the EU’s policy 
to not have a policy on internal secession. 
Second, the EU’s silence on secession leaves room for other voices to fill the gap, 
as has been the case in Catalonia. The Catalan desire to hold a referendum on 
independence is prohibited by Spanish law. Catalanists are also unable to argue that they 
have a remedial right to secession, given that Spain is not gravely oppressing them. Thus, 
one domain where Catalanists have sought to push their cause has been in the EU. The 
president of Catalonia’s regional government has been lobbying EU officials to support 
Catalonia’s bid for independence. Rather than adopting a policy that states that 
subnational movements must reach a consensus with their national governments for 
increased autonomy or providing for the conditions when the European Union can 
pressure national governments to allow referenda on increased autonomy or 
independence, the EU’s silence has been replaced by noise. It seems somewhat 
problematic that the EU’s policy of “conservative neutrality” can justify two divergent 
outcomes in regions with similar characteristics; in the case of Scotland, the EU’s policy 
supports Scotland’s right to decide, while in Catalonia, it accepts Spain’s denial of 
Catalonia’s self-proclaimed right to decide.   
However, the European Union will be unable to adopt a policy without the 
consent of its member states, several of which have strong secessionist movements in 
their own countries. Starting a discussion on a policy or framework might be a good first 
step. The EU’s institutional divisions and the concerns of member states with strong 
subnational movements will likely prevent the adoption of an official policy. 
Nonetheless, starting a discussion on the framework regarding internal secession so as to 
achieve a form of consensus may provide states and subnational actors more certainty 
and reduce the chances of secessionist movements becoming more problematic. 
F. CONCLUSION 
An independent Catalonia would undoubtedly face numerous challenges in 
maintaining the current defense and security capabilities it possesses through its 
association with the Spanish state. Catalonia’s problematic situation has the potential to 
 89
destabilize security and defense in profound ways. Despite Madrid’s nullification of the 
November 2014 referendum, the Catalonian independence movement is unlikely to 
subside given that both Madrid and Barcelona remain entrenched and fail to 
communicate effectively. An independent Catalonia would have more trouble addressing 
its short-term security vulnerabilities due to its more precarious relationship with its 
prospective former ruler, which increases the uncertainty regarding Catalonia’s future. 
Unanimous recognition by the European Union is very unlikely for Catalonia, though an 
associational agreement could be a possibility. Membership in NATO for Catalonia will 
also be unlikely, unless Spain endorses it, though a partnership agreement could be 
plausible. The European Union should attempt—however difficult it may be—to develop 
a more explicit policy or to establish guidelines to manage internal secession, even if its 
first attempts are only able to establish a lowest common denominator framework, such 
as the importance of seeking peaceful resolution of national problems. Establishing at 
least a common framework or consensus on principles concerning secession could reduce 
uncertainty and mitigate the potential for radicalized secessionist movements.  
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While EU political and economic integration arose as an ideal of policy to prevent  
war  among the nations of the union, in the year 2015, nationalist movements persist and 
have the potential to become destabilizing in a manner that would have shocked 
proponents of the European ideal in the 1990s. In this connection, the role of regions in 
the leading nations of the EU has arisen as a theme of security policy for its comparison 
and contrast with those parts of Europe that from the 1990s until the present have 
descended into war, up to and including the Ukraine-Russian conflict.  
 Regionalists, who had hoped for increased subsidiarity in the aftermath of the 
Maastricht Treaty, have seen their ambitions largely dependent on their national 
governments. The EU Committee of Regions only has a limited capacity to shape 
regional movements. While some aspects of the EU have become supranational, most of 
the EU’s decision-making power rests with national governments.  
With regard to secession and self-determination, the EU has largely refrained 
from adopting a policy, which has led to differing outcomes, facilitated by differing 
national constitutions and courts. The EU’s lack of policy on internal secession has 
driven EU politicians sometimes to make seemingly contradictory statements regarding 
secession—no surprise in a political entity as complicated as the EU and in view of the 
realities of Europe’s past.387 The EU, by deferring to national governments, has de facto 
recognized Scotland’s right to decide—a historical region similar to Catalonia—while 
supporting Madrid’s refusal to allow Catalonia to hold a referendum. Thus, national 
governments have remained the primary force in shaping the outcome of subnational 
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movements—an important insight into the making of policy in a time of great stress and 
strain on nation states in Europe and their citizens.  
A. WHY BAVARIAN AND CATALAN REGIONALISMS TOOK 
DIFFERENT PATHS 
On the one hand, Bavarians have largely felt accommodated in modern 
Germany’s federal structure while Catalans have often felt neglected by the Spanish 
nation state even since 1975. There are three major differences between Catalonian and 
Bavarian regionalism that have led to different outcomes. First, Bavaria’s accession to a 
unified Little Germany in the mid-19th century was a negotiated union on a model of 
several such mutual pacts of old Europe with their dynastic origins in the First Reich.  
The German nation state has largely respected, and even celebrates regional political and 
cultural institutions, treating them as a core element of the nation state. Catalonia’s 
accession to Spain was due to a dynastic union; as the union weakened, so did the bond 
between Aragon and Castile. Castile also began viewing Catalonia more as a threat than 
as a constituent part of Spain and Catalonia also began regarding the state as a threat to 
its identity. Castile has historically enacted measures that have either weakened or 
abolished Catalonia’s political and cultural autonomy. Thus, Catalan regionalism became 
less compatible with state nationalism by the end of the 19th century whereas Bavarian 
regionalism had become consistent with a larger notion of German nationalism. 
Second, Spain had developed no modern sense of national solidarity that could 
weather difficult crises. Any sense of Spanishness was originally based on the attachment 
to a dynastic union and empire. When the empire began falling apart, there was no 
common national language or program to unify the Spanish people as was the case in 
Spain’s neighbors in the wake of the French Revolution. In contrast, German nationalists 
from the early 19th century onwards, despite the absence of a unitary, centralized nation 
state unlike Britain and France, achieved German cultural unification under the ideal of 
the Kulturnation and then with the blood and iron of Bismarck. Spain, unlike Germany, 
built few large-scale monuments in the early 19th century that could help foment a shared 
sense of national identity. Germany, in contrast—with an educated middle class that 
became the bearer of nationalism as the secular religion of the industrial age—not only 
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had patriotic groups that helped overcome class and regional divides but also had built 
“national monuments in stone and mortar.”388 Construction for the Walhalla, a national 
monument to German unity built in Regensburg, began more than forty years before 
German unification.389 Spain, on the other hand, had few monuments or national symbols 
that could memorialize the sentiment felt in the midst of its War of Independence, not the 
least because it lacked such an educated middle class who flourished in the progress of 
the 19th century. The largest structures in Spain that had acted as a symbol of the nation, 
the Catholic Church, increasingly became a contested institution and symbol, and the 
cosmopolitanism as well as anti-liberal doctrines of the church in the 19th and 20th 
centuries worked against the forces of nation building. 
One contributing factor to Spain’s lack of a common cultural basis was its lack of 
linguistic unification. Whereas High German had achieved widespread use among 
educated Germans by the 18th century who were also plentiful in number versus 
elsewhere in Europe, Castilian during the same period had not achieved a similar measure 
of language consolidation.390 To make matters more problematic, Catalans, who once 
viewed Castilian as an apolitical mode of communication, later regarded it as anti-
Catalan. A contributing measure that hindered Spain’s national unity was the delayed and 
ineffective role that the state had in education. 
German nationalists deliberately leveraged educational institutions and formed 
organizations and associations to promote their ideals in the upheaval of Napoleonic and 
Revolutionary Europe and in the decades until 1848. As early as 1806, German nation-
builders recognized the importance of education reform as a way to achieve national 
strength and unity.391 Spanish nation-builders were in a slightly different position. Given 
that Spain had existed for centuries, there may have been a smaller recognition of the 
need to nationalize the masses in order to achieve political reform. Furthermore, even if 
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Spanish nationalists tried to spread their message, most people were illiterate and there 
were few agreed-upon national symbols that could act as a substitute for national 
literature. Whereas Germany was more than 75 percent literate by the mid-19th century, 
Spain was less than 25 percent literate.392 By 1900, more than 90 percent of Germans 
were literate compared to less than half of Spaniards.393 The majority of Spaniards were 
illiterate until the 20th century and there was no effective national program to mobilize 
the masses toward national goals. German national awareness, on the other hand, began 
to spread long before the presence of a nation state. German authors and nationalists 
spread a form of German patriotism embodied in the notion of Kulturnation that eclipsed 
class and territorial divides as early as the first decades of the 19th century.  
Third, the Spanish state has a long history of centralization and only a recent 
history of limited devolution in Catalonia. Catalonia has also rebelled against the state’s 
centralizing policies, often causing Madrid to affirm Spain’s unitary character. Hitler’s 
centralizing and nationalist measures have been wholeheartedly discredited in Germany, 
whereas Franco’s legacy is somewhat more contested in Spain. This dichotomy is 
reflected in Spain’s constitution that affirms its common fatherland and indivisible unity 
for all Spaniards while at the same time providing means for nationalities and regions to 
achieve a degree of autonomy.394  
B. REGIONS AND THE EU 
Whereas Germany’s institutional arrangements accommodate Bavarian 
representation in the federal government, and by extension at the EU level, Spain’s 
comparatively more centralized framework has limited Catalonia’s influence in the EU. 
Without reforming territorial representation in the Spanish government it will be difficult 
for Catalonian interests to be fully represented in Spain’s government or the EU. The 
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institutional setup in Spain likely contributes to Catalonia’s desire to divorce itself from 
Spain. 
However, the security implications of any Catalan secession would be 
problematic for both Madrid and Catalonia. The Spanish government is prohibiting 
Catalonia from holding a referendum on independence (whether binding or not) and there 
is little discussion in Madrid of reforming the constitution. While Catalonia’s 
independence movement has remained peaceful, the relationship between Madrid and 
Catalan nationalists has deteriorated, mitigating the chances for a mutually agreed-upon 
solution. Yet the security situation for an independent Catalonia, particularly if it secedes 
without Madrid’s consent, will likely reduce its own security. While both sides have 
largely refrained from resorting to violence in Catalonia, a continuation of the current 
tension without strong attempts by Brussels, Madrid, and Barcelona to resolve the 
impasse might allow for more radical nationalist independence groups to gain 
momentum.  
Rather than remaining silent on secession, the EU might benefit from developing 
pragmatic guidelines that subnational and central governments could agree on. While the 
EU currently has a limited influence in shaping secessionist movements along its 
periphery, it still has the opportunity to influence internal secessionist movements. By 
making future membership in the EU dependent upon a peaceful separation (as might 
have been the case in Scotland), a principle that national and regional governments might 
agree upon, the EU has the potential to mitigate secessionist movements from becoming 
radicalized.  
EU member states could take a more pragmatic approach that neither favors nor 
rejects regionalist aspirations but seeks to understand their root causes and offer 
solutions. European integration cannot be taken for granted; Europe’s continued stability 
requires deliberate balance between the principles of territorial integrity and the principle 
of self-determination.  If the EU fails to reach a consensus regarding self-determination 
and territorial integrity, its influence in shaping international norms will be curtailed. The 
ambiguity in international law combined with the absence of a European consensus 
regarding these principles will be exploited by actors who harbor irredentist motives.   
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